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THE YEAR IN REVIEW 2012 
 
SELECTED CASES FROM THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT, 
THE ALASKA COURT OF APPEALS, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, THE UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA, AND 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | BUSINESS LAW | CIVIL PROCEDURE | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW | 
CONTRACT LAW | CRIMINAL LAW | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | ELECTION LAW | 
EMPLOYMENT LAW | ENVIRONMENTAL LAW | ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY | FAMILY LAW | INSURANCE LAW | NATIVE LAW |  PROPERTY LAW | 
TORT LAW | TRUSTS & ESTATES LAW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of 
selected state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither 
comprehensive in breadth, as several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues 
within individual cases are omitted. Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an 
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community to 
judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries are grouped by subject matter. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State, Department of Fish & Game 
In Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State, Department of Fish & Game,
1
 the 
supreme court (1) upheld a regulation setting out criteria for classifying fisheries, and (2) 
found that per capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users 
was permissible data for the Board of Fisheries (“Board”) to use in making their 
determination.
2
 At different points in the last several decades, the Chitina subdistrict of 
the Copper River Basin has been classified as either a “personal use” fishery or a 
subsistence fishery.
3
 Most recently, the Board labeled Chitina as “personal use,” and 
citizen groups challenged this finding by claiming the regulation used to make it was 
facially unconstitutional, in large part because it favored rural communities.
4
 The 
superior court held that the regulation was constitutional, but remanded to the Board to 
better articulate its standard in applying the regulation, with instructions not to consider 
the per capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users.
5
 On 
appeal, the supreme court agreed with the superior court’s finding that the regulation was 
                                                 
1
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5
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 2 
constitutional, but found that information regarding per capita consumption may be 
relevant in making a subsistence or “personal use” designation, and therefore should not 
be categorically excluded.
6
 Affirming in part and reversing in part, the supreme court (1) 
upheld a regulation setting out criteria for classifying fisheries, and (2) found that per 
capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users was 
permissible data for the Board of Fisheries to use in making their determination.
7
 
 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. State 
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. State,
8
 the supreme court held that the Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources’ (“Department”) calculation of the fair market value of 
land covered by right-of-way leases for the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (“TAPS”) may 
properly (1) exclude reductions for reserved rights, and (2) include uncontested 
submerged lands.
9
 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (“Alyeska”) appealed the terms of 
its TAPS lease renewal imposed by the Department.
10
 Alyeska claimed that the renewal 
was improper under the Alaska statute that governs the calculation of the lease price.
11
 
The supreme court determined that the lease price was properly calculated based on the 
fair market value of the state land and did not require consideration of the rights granted 
or retained in the lease.
12
 The supreme court also held that the TAPS lease may properly 
include submerged lands because the state holds presumptive title to all submerged lands 
within its original 1959 borders unless the federal government has contested or claimed 
an interest in those lands.
13
 Affirming, the supreme court held that the Department 
calculation of the fair market value of land covered by right-of-way leases for TAPS may 
properly (1) exclude reductions for reserved rights, and (2) include uncontested 
submerged lands.
14
 
 
Caywood v. State, Department of Natural Resources 
In Caywood v. State, Department of Natural Resources,
15
 the supreme court held that (1) 
restrictions on the use of the Rex Trail imposed by the Department of Natural Resources 
(“Department”) are authorized by law,16 and (2) restrictions imposed by the Department 
limiting the weight of vehicles that may travel on the Rex Trail during certain times of 
year met the reasonable basis standard for decision-making by a state agency.
17
 In 2008, 
the Department’s northern region manager issued a decision restricting vehicles weighing 
more than 1,500 pounds from using the Rex Trail between April 15 and October 31, due 
to potential road damage.
18
 Caywood appealed the decision, the Department 
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Commissioner denied Caywood’s appeal, and the superior court affirmed.19 On appeal to 
the supreme court, Caywood argued that the Commissioner did not have authority to 
impose the restrictions, or alternatively that the necessity of the restrictions was not 
supported by substantial evidence.
20
 The supreme court first agreed that the 
Commissioner did not have authority under the relevant Alaska statute because that 
statute was limited to situations in which the land is held by a grantee, but it reasoned that 
the Commissioner did have authority under the administrative code, which recognizes the 
Commissioner’s authority over certain rights-of-way.21 Next, the supreme court disagreed 
that the restrictions must be supported by substantial evidence, instead holding that policy 
decisions regarding restrictions on the use of state land are reviewed under the reasonable 
basis standard, and that the Commissioner had ample evidence to make his decision.
22
 
Affirming, the supreme court held that (1) restrictions on the use of the Rex Trail 
imposed by the Department are authorized by law,
23
 and (2) restrictions imposed by the 
Department limiting the weight of vehicles that may travel on the Rex Trail during 
certain times of year met the reasonable basis standard for decision-making by a state 
agency.
24
 
 
Cutler v. Kodiak Island Borough 
In Cutler v. Kodiak Island Borough,
25
 the supreme court held that the Kodiak Island 
Borough (“Borough”) does not have authority to record liens for non-payment of garbage 
services.
26
 The Sabados hired David to tear down a structure on their property in 
Kodiak.
27
 Unbeknownst to the Sabados, David set up a commercial garbage account with 
the Borough, and accrued a $5000 balance on that account.
28
 David failed to pay, and the 
account became delinquent.
29
 In 2009 the Borough recorded a lien against the property, 
and in 2010 petitioned for foreclosure.
30
 Upon learning of the lien and foreclosure action, 
Cutler, the new owner of the property, filed an answer and counterclaim arguing that the 
lien had been wrongfully recorded.
31
 The superior court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Borough and entered default judgment on the garbage-service liens.
32
 
Relying on other instances where the legislature specifically granted boroughs the 
authority to record property liens, the supreme court reasoned that boroughs do not 
possess this authority where the legislature has not made such a grant.
33
 Reversing, the 
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supreme court held that the Borough does not have the authority to record liens for non-
payment of garbage services.
34
    
 
In re Joan K. 
In In re Joan K.,
35
 the supreme court held that a thirty day involuntary commitment to a 
psychiatric institute was justified where clear and convincing evidence supported the 
finding that the individual suffered from a mental illness and posed a substantial risk of 
bodily harm to herself.
36
 Joan disappeared for three weeks, and her mother later found her 
and brought her to a hospital.
37
 Emergency room staff examined Joan and found her 
confused, and she also tested positive for amphetamines and cocaine.
38
 A physician 
sought Joan’s involuntary commitment for mental health treatment.39 The lower court 
ordered a thirty day commitment, which Joan appealed.
40
 The supreme court affirmed, 
reasoning that Joan’s continued illegal drug use would exacerbate her mental illness and 
cause a self-destructive downward spiral of her mental and physical health.
41
 The court 
noted that, although Joan never articulated a desire to harm herself, she showed 
symptoms of lethargy and opioid withdrawal that follow stimulant abuse.
42
 The court 
further noted that the plain text of the relevant Alaska statute directs courts to consider 
recent behavior and does not require affirmative statements regarding future drug use.
43
 
Affirming, the supreme court held that Joan’s thirty day involuntary commitment was 
justified where clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that she suffered 
from a mental illness and posed a substantial risk of bodily harm to herself.
44
 
 
McCleod v. Parnell 
In McCleod v. Parnell,
45
 the supreme court held that (1) state records which are preserved 
or are appropriate for preservation under the Records Management Act are subject to 
review under the Public Records Act, and (2) the use of private email accounts to conduct 
state business, alone, is not a per se obstruction to “public records.”46McCleod brought an 
action in superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that all emails sent between Sarah 
Palin and her husband’s private email accounts were “public records” if the subject of the 
email in any way related to official business of the state, and also seeking an injunction 
compelling the governor’s office to preserve these emails, stop using private email 
accounts to conduct government business, and to retrieve deleted emails from those 
accounts.
47
 The superior court ultimately granted the State’s motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the case, holding that not every email referring to state business 
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 5 
is a “public record,” that there is an element of discretion in deciding which emails to 
preserve, and that using private emails to conduct state business is not a per se 
obstruction of access to public records.
48
 However, the court held additionally that state 
employees who fail to preserve public records that should be preserved might violate the 
law.
49
 The supreme court agreed in part, reasoning that the legislature intended that both 
public records that are preserved and those that are appropriate for preservation are 
subject to review under the Public Records Act,
50
 but that the use of private emails is no 
more of a violation of the Act than communicating through paper letters.
51
 Affirming in 
part, the supreme court held that (1) state records which are preserved or are appropriate 
for preservation under the Records Management Act are subject to review under the 
Public Records Act, and (2) the use of private email accounts to conduct state business, 
alone, is not a per se obstruction to “public records.”.52 
 
Price v. Unisea, Inc.  
In Price v. Unisea, Inc.,
53
 the supreme court held that an international organization is 
immune from suit where immunity has not been expressly waived.
54
 In 2006, Price was 
injured while working for the International Pacific Halibut Commission (“IPHC”),an 
international organization established by a treaty between the United States and Canada.
55
 
Price filed a negligence action but the superior court dismissed the suit on immunity 
grounds.
56
 Price appealed, arguing that IPHC had waived immunity in their employment 
agreement.
57
 The supreme court rejected Price’s arguments, reasoning that the 
International Organizations Immunities Act provides absolute immunity to international 
organizations that must be expressly waived.
58
 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the 
employee benefits clause in the contract did not transform into a clause waiving 
immunity for suits related to those benefits in state court.
59
 Affirming, the supreme court 
held that an international organization is immune from suit where immunity has not been 
expressly waived.
60
 
Runstrom v. Alaska Native Med. Ctr. 
In Runstrom v. Alaska Native Med. Ctr.,
61
 the supreme court held that an employer can 
rebut an employee’s claim of being temporarily totally disabled by providing substantial 
evidence that the employee could actually return to work.
62
 While working, Runstrom’s 
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eyes were sprayed with fluids from an HIV-positive patient.
63
 Subsequently, she received 
temporary total disability (“TTD”) until the Alaska Native Medical Center (“Center”) 
later controverted her benefits because the Center determined no further medical care was 
needed after her HIV test came back negative.
64
 The Center also attempted to place 
Runstrom back into her previously held position, but she refused.
65
 About a month later, 
Runstrom was terminated for her failure to return to work.
66
 On appeal, Runstrom argued 
that she was improperly denied TTD benefits from the Alaska Workers’ Compensation 
Board because her employer failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the 
presumption that she was disabled.
67
 The supreme court affirmed the Workers’ 
Compensation Commission, reasoning a doctor and a primary health provider’s opinions 
that she could return to work provided substantial evidence supporting the employer’s 
and the Board’s determinations.68 Furthermore, the court noted that Runstrom failed to 
offer any evidence to the contrary.
69
 Affirming the Commission, the supreme court held 
that an employer can rebut an employee’s claim of being temporarily totally disabled by 
providing substantial evidence that the employee could actually return to work.
70
 
  
Sitkans for Responsible Government v. City & Borough of Sitka  
In Sitkans for Responsible Government v. City & Borough of Sitka,
71
 the supreme court 
held that an initiative to make current law applicable to all, instead of just some, 
transactions of a certain type cannot be contrary to law and, therefore, unenforceable.
72
 
Sitka law required that the city’s assembly pass an ordinance which must be ratified by 
Sitka voters before large land transactions could be completed.
73
 However, Sawmill Cove 
was put under the management of a board of directors who only needed a resolution from 
the assembly in order to complete large land transactions.
74
 After a citizens’ petition to 
align large land transactions involving Sawmill Cove with all other land transactions by 
the city was denied by the city’s municipal clerk before collection of supporting elector 
signatures, a complaint was filed in superior court.
75
 On appeal, the citizens argued that 
the initiative did not violate the Sitka Charter because it would not add any procedures 
that were not already in place for similar transactions.
76
 The supreme court agreed and 
reversed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that the initiative was only an extension 
of current applicable law.
77
 It further reasoned that even if supporting elector signatures 
are necessary before a voter approval is appropriate under the Sitka Charter, such grounds 
cannot justify finding an extension of current applicable law contrary to law just because 
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current applicable law may violate the charter.
78
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that a citizens’ initiative that would make current law applicable to 
all, instead of just some, transactions of a certain type cannot be contrary to law, and, 
therefore, unenforceable.
79
 
 
State, Department of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council 
In State, Department of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council,
80
 the supreme 
court held that the 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan (“BBAP”) – a plan that directs how the 
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) will manage state uplands, shorelands, 
tidelands, and submerged lands – is not a regulation.81 Tribal councils filed suit against 
the DNR alleging that the DNR unlawfully adopted the BBAP, and sought declaratory 
judgment that the BBAP no longer had any legal effect.
82
 The DNR argued that the 
causes of action at issue were barred because they were not brought within the proper 
limitations period.
83
 Tribal councils argued that, since the BBAP was a regulation, it was 
subject to judicial review at any time.
84
 The lower court concluded that the BBAP was a 
regulation and therefore was subject to judicial review.
85
 The supreme court reversed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the BBAP did not affect the public and was not 
used by the agency in dealing with the public.
86
 The court noted that, though the BBAP 
certainly affected the public in a broad sense, this nonspecific, downstream effect alone 
was insufficient to demonstrate sufficient meaningful impact.
87
 Reversing the lower 
court, the supreme court held that the BBAP is not a regulation.
88
 
 
State Department of Health & Social Services v. North Star Hospital 
In State Department of Health & Social Services v. North Star Hospital,
89
 the supreme 
court held that an agency calculating Medicaid rates may abuse its discretion by relying 
on outdated data when current data would produce significantly different results.
90
 The 
Department of Health & Social Services (DHSS) calculated the Medicaid payment rate 
for North Star Hospital (NSH) for fiscal years 2008–2011 using a report from 2005 even 
though NSH’s home-office costs nearly doubled in 2006.91 Nevertheless, since NSH 
could only provide an unaudited report for 2006 to DHSS sixty days before the start of 
the re-basing year, NSH’s base rate was set using the 2005 report.92 The lower court held 
that DHSS abused its discretion.
93
 On appeal, DHSS argued that it did not abuse its 
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discretion because it needs at least sixty days to calculate rates and an unaudited report 
was unreliable for the calculation.
94
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that a temporary base rate could have been given to NSH until a final 
rate could have been calculated using an audited report from fiscal year 2006.
95
 The court 
further reasoned that NSH was not at fault for the delay of the report, and DHSS 
approved temporary rates for two other medical centers and did not set its final rate until 
the audited report for NSH was completed.
96
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that an agency calculating Medicate rates may abuse its discretion by 
relying on outdated data when current data would produce significantly different 
results.
97
 
 
State, Department of Labor & Workforce Development, Division of Workers’ 
Compensation, Second Injury Fund v. Tongass Business Center 
In State, Department of Labor & Workforce Development, Division of Workers’ 
Compensation, Second Injury Fund v. Tongass Business Center,
98
 the supreme court held 
that a party has thirty days to appeal a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, 
which begins to run the day the decision is served on the parties.
99
 Tongass Business 
Center sought reimbursement from a government fund (“Fund”) for payments made to a 
workers’ compensation claimant.100 The Workers’ Compensation Board granted the 
petition and the Fund appealed.
101
 The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission 
(“Commission”) denied the Fund’s motion to accept a late-filed appeal, and dismissed the 
appeal.
102
 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the Commission’s decision. 103 The 
court reasoned that, because the Fund timely requested reconsideration, its appeal was 
due within thirty days after the date the request for reconsideration was denied.
104
 The 
court noted that a petition is considered denied if no action on a petition is taken within 
the time allowed for ordering a reconsideration.
105
 The court further noted that the 
Commission was not justified in its conclusion that the petition was denied because 
action was taken on the petition.
106
 Thus, reversing the Commission, the supreme court 
held that a party has thirty days to appeal a decision of the Workers’ Compensation 
Board, which begins to run the day the decision is served on the parties.
107
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State, Department of Commerce, Community & Economic Development v. Wold 
In State, Department of Commerce, Community & Economic Development v. Wold,
108
 the 
supreme court held that a desk review with conclusory statements does not provide the 
substantial evidence necessary to support violations of the Uniform Standards of 
Professional Appraisal Practice (“USPAP”).109 Wold appraised two residential properties 
and a partial interest in a marina facility for a divorce proceeding
110
 The divorce 
proceeding went to trial, where Wold’s appraisals were determined to be significantly 
lower than the actual value of the assets.
111
 Subsequently, after Wold’s appraisals were 
investigated and reviewed by the Board of Certified Real Estate Appraisers, the Board 
determined his appraisals violated provisions of the USPAP.
112
 Wold appealed the 
Board’s decision and the superior court reversed seven of the Board’s eight findings, 
holding that these findings were not supported by substantial evidence.
113
 On appeal, the 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision in part and reversed in part, finding 
that no violations had occurred.
114
 It reasoned that under the substantial evidence test for 
administrative factual findings, the expert-supplied desk review relied upon during the 
Board’s findings was inadequate because most conclusions were given without sufficient 
supportable evidence.
115
Affirming in part and reversing in part, the supreme court held 
that a desk review with conclusory statements does not provide the substantial evidence 
necessary to support violations of the USPAP.
116
 
 
Toliver v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights 
In Toliver v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, the supreme court held that the 
State Commission for Human Rights (“Commission”) has a statutory duty to reasonably 
investigate claims, and this duty implies that the Commission must make reasonable 
efforts to interview witnesses.
117
 Pro se appellant Toliver filed a complaint with the 
Human Rights Commission alleging that two stores violated his rights and privileges on 
the basis of race.
118
 The Commission concluded that the allegations were not supported 
by any substantial evidence and closed the case.
119
 Toliver appealed the case to the 
superior court, which affirmed the decision of the Commission and concluded that 
conducting interviews was not necessary because the named individuals had not been 
present when the incidents occurred.
120
 The supreme court reversed the superior court, 
holding that the Commission must make reasonable efforts to investigate.
121
 The court 
reasoned that the Commission breached its statutory duty to conduct an impartial 
investigation when it did not interview the individuals Toliver identified who could 
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corroborate his claim.
122
 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that the 
Commission has a statutory duty to reasonably investigate claims, and this duty implies 
that the Commission must make reasonable efforts to interview witnesses.
123
 
 
Winterrowd v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Motors Vehicles 
In Winterrowd v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles,
124
 the 
supreme court held that dismissal of a suit against the DMV is proper when a plaintiff has 
not exhausted his administrative remedies.
125
 Winterrowd struck a moose while 
driving.
126
 Pursuant to the DMV’s policy of suspending the licenses of uninsured drivers 
who get in accidents where damages exceed $501, the DMV informed Winterrowd that 
his license would be suspended.
127
 Winterrowd contested the suspension by claiming his 
damages did not exceed $501, so the DMV scheduled an administrative hearing and 
informed Winterrowd that his failure to attend would waive his right to challenge the 
DMV’s ruling.128 Before he received the hearing notice, Winterrowd filed suit seeking to 
keep the DMV from suspending his license, and several days before the scheduled 
hearings the superior court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.
129
 After dismissal, Winterrowd failed to attend his hearing, and the superior 
court denied his motion for reconsideration.
130
 On appeal, the supreme court agreed that 
Winterrowd must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, and filing suit 
before his hearing as well as his subsequent failure to attend it warranted dismissal of his 
complaint.
131
 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that dismissal of a suit 
against the DMV is proper when a plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative 
remedies.
132
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Luckart v. State 
In Luckart v. State,
133
 the court of appeals held that the general requirement that a 
sentencing panel sentence a defendant in the presumptive range for their crime does not 
apply when a court has referred a case to the panel because the court feels a punishment 
in the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust.
134
 Luckart was convicted of 
attempted first-degree sexual assault but was young and had no prior record.
135
 The lower 
court referred the case to the three-judge sentencing panel, finding it would be manifestly 
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unjust to impose a sentence within the presumptive range for the offense.
136
 The panel 
agreed, but believed it could not extend a more lenient sentence to Luckart because AS 
12.55.175(e) required the panel to conclude Luckart had potential for rehabilitation in 
order to sentence outside the presumptive range.
137
 On remand, the lower court sentenced 
Luckart within statutory range, and Luckart appealed.
138
 The court of appeals vacated the 
sentence imposed by the lower court and remanded the case to the three-judge panel to 
impose a sentence, reasoning that the three-judge panel misread AS 12.55.175(e).
139
 The 
court of appeals noted that the statute does not apply to cases that are referred to the 
three-judge panel based on a finding that any sentence within the applicable presumptive 
range would be manifestly unjust.
140
 Instead, the court reasoned that the statute only 
applies to cases that are referred based on the non-statutory mitigator of exceptional 
potential for rehabilitation.
141
 Vacating and remanding the case to the lower court, the 
court of appeals held that the general requirement that a sentencing panel sentence a 
defendant in the presumptive range for their crime does not apply when a court has 
referred a case to the panel because the court feels a punishment in the presumptive range 
would be manifestly unjust.
142
 
 
BUSINESS LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Airline Support, Inc. v. ASM Capital II, L.P. 
In Airline Support, Inc. v. ASM Capital II, L.P.,
143
 the supreme court held that there may 
be a disputed question of material fact as to whether an accounting manager has apparent 
authority to execute an assignment agreement.
144
 ASM Capital entered into an agreement 
with Airline Support, Inc. (“Airline”) through Airline’s accounting manager to buy a 
claim of unsecured creditors.
145
 Airline filed suit in superior court to have the agreement 
set aside.
146
 The superior court declined to do so finding that Airline’s accounting 
manager had apparent authority to execute the agreement on behalf of Airline.
147
 On 
appeal, the supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that there was a 
genuine issue of fact as to apparent authority; specifically, the reasonableness of the third 
party’s interpretation of the principal’s manifestations and the reasonableness of the third 
party’s reliance.148 The court noted that, while it was reasonable to infer that Airline had 
purposely put the solicitation before its accounting manager because she had the authority 
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to transfer the claim, it is also reasonable to infer that the title “accounting manager” does 
not obviously carry with it the authority to sell a company’s significant assets.149 
Reversing and remanding for further proceedings, the supreme court held that there may 
be a disputed question of material fact as to whether an accounting manager has apparent 
authority to execute an assignment agreement.
150
 
 
Borgen v. A & M Motors, Inc. 
In Borgen v. A & M Motors, Inc.,
151
 the supreme court held that, under the Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA), a good faith defense is not available to a 
seller if the seller misrepresents a material fact about an item.
152
 In 2004, Borgen 
purchased a used motor home from A & M.
153
 The used motor home was sold to Borgen 
as a 2003 model.
154
 However, Borgen discovered that the motor home was actually a 
2002 model.
155
 A jury found that A & M had not engaged in unfair or deceptive acts 
under the UTPA, but that it had misrepresented the model year.
156
 On appeal, Borgen 
argued that only a material misrepresentation and subsequent damage were necessary to 
establish a claim under UTPA.
157
 The supreme court agreed, reasoning that the language 
in UTPA implied that “knowingly” did not apply to affirmative misrepresentations.158 
The court further found that other courts had deemed the seller’s intent, whether good or 
bad, irrelevant when dealing with affirmative misrepresentations under similar statutes.
159
 
Vacating and remanding the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a good 
faith defense is not available to a seller if the seller misrepresents a material fact about an 
item.
160
 
 
Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc. 
In Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc.,
161
 the supreme court held that a corporation may be 
awarded attorneys’ fees when litigation arises due to materially misleading proxy 
statements.
162
 When up for re-election as director of the Cook Inlet Region, Inc. 
(“CIRI”), Rude ran on an independent slate called New Alliance for the Future of CIRI, 
Inc. (“New Alliance”).163 CIRI filed suit against New Alliance for including materially 
misleading statements in its proxy materials.
164
 The superior court found that five sets of 
statements in the materials were egregiously misleading, voided the New Alliance 
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proxies, and awarded CIRI attorneys’ fees.165 The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that 
most of Rude’s claims were technically moot since he had been removed from the 
board,
166
 that CIRI followed all statutory and common law procedures in holding its 
board of directors election,
167
 and that attorneys’ fees were appropriately awarded.168 
Affirming the superior court on all counts, the supreme court held that a corporation may 
be awarded attorneys’ fees when litigation arises due to materially misleading proxy 
statements.
169
 
 
State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson 
In State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson,
170
 the supreme court held 
that the punitive interest rate used for tax delinquency should not be used as a 
prejudgment interest rate where it would result in an unjust windfall for one party.
171
 A 
class of nonresident fishermen sued the State for charging nonresident fishermen three 
times more than resident fishermen for permits and licenses.
172
 The case was appealed to 
the supreme court five times.
173
 On one previous appeal, the supreme court determined 
the State owed the nonresident fishermen a refund with interest, and that the interest 
should be calculated under the rate used for delinquent taxpayers in AS 43.05.280.
174
 In 
this fifth appeal, the supreme court found that an interest rate calculated according to its 
previous holding would lead to a manifestly unjust result.
175
 The court reasoned the AS 
43.05.280 rate was too high for the present case, seeing as the State would be required to 
pay over $62 million in interest.
176
 Reversing its previous decision, the supreme court 
held that the punitive interest rate used for tax delinquency should not be used as a 
prejudgment interest rate where it would result in an unjust windfall for one party.
177
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Ahtna Tene Nené v. State, Department of Fish & Game 
In Ahtna Tene Nené v. State, Department of Fish & Game,
178
 the supreme court held that 
a pro se litigant who has a law degree but no bar license may not recover attorney’s 
fees.
179
  In response to displeasure regarding the system that regulated hunting permits, 
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the Alaska Board of Game established a new system.
180
 Kenneth Manning, a pro se 
litigant with a law degree, decided to challenge this new system.
181
 Successful at trial 
with help from the State, Manning was awarded attorney’s fees even though he was not a 
bar-licensed attorney.
182
 On appeal, the supreme court ruled that it was improper to grant 
Manning attorney’s fees.183 The court reasoned that pro se litigants without a law degree 
are the same as non-bar-licensed law graduates.
184
 For both, it is difficult for courts to 
value the time of non-lawyers performing legal services and, more importantly, allowing 
non-bar attorneys to recover fees would create an incentive to not expend the time or 
money necessary to be admitted to and maintain membership in a bar association.
185
 
Vacating the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a pro se litigant who has 
a law degree but no bar license may not recover attorney’s fees.186  
 
Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers v. Kenai Peninsula Borough 
In Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,
187
 the supreme court 
held that when both parties prevail on main issues, the court may refrain from designating 
a prevailing party, so that neither is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.188 Alliance of 
Concerned Taxpayers requested a court declaration that two ballot initiatives establishing 
term limits for school board members and members of the Kenai Peninsula Borough 
Assembly (“Borough”) be applied to the incumbents reelected in the same election when 
the initiative was approved, while the Borough argued such initiatives should not 
apply.
189
 The superior court granted partial summary judgment to each party and as a 
result chose not to designate either party as the prevailing party, so that neither was 
entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.190 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling, holding that when both parties prevail on main issues the court may refrain 
from designating a prevailing party, so that neither is entitled to attorneys’ fees and 
costs.
191
 
 
Barton v. North Slope Borough School District  
In Barton v. North Slope Borough School District,
192
 the supreme court ruled that expert 
testimony regarding the standards used to design sports fields set forth in a manual could 
appreciably assist a jury.
193
 Barton was injured at a high school football game when she 
was struck, near the sidelines, by at least one player who ran out of bounds.
194
 She sued 
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the school district for negligent design of the football field.
195
 The superior court found 
the school district not negligent.
196
 On appeal, Barton argued that the superior court 
should not have excluded an expert’s testimony concerning the use of a manual to ensure 
sports fields were designed correctly.
197
 The supreme court held that the standards in the 
manual could have appreciably assisted the jury because the jury could have used the 
information to draw their own inferences of whether negligence was involved.
198
 
However, the court found that excluding the testimony was harmless error because the 
main dispute between the two sides did not concern the field’s dimensions.199 Affirming 
the lower court, the supreme court ruled that expert testimony regarding the standards 
used to design sports fields set forth in a manual could appreciably assist a jury.
200
 
 
Friends of Willow Lake, Inc. v. State, Department of Transportation & Public 
Facilities 
In Friends of Willow Lake, Inc. v. State, Department of Transportation & Public 
Facilities,
201
 the supreme court held that to satisfy associational standing not all the 
members of an association have to participate in the suit and the matter does not have to 
be a pure question of law.
202
 Willow Lake is a float plane facility operated by the State.
203
  
The State issued a use plan that set forth rules for Willow Lake’s recreational and aircraft 
users.
204
 Friends of Willow Lake (“FOWL”), a non-profit corporation whose members 
are Alaska residents and Willow Lake users, filed suit.
205
 The superior court ruled that 
FOWL lacked standing and that the use plan was properly issued.
206
 On appeal, the 
supreme court held an association can have standing if its members would otherwise have 
standing, the issues are related to the association’s purpose, and the claim and relief 
requested do not require the participation of individual members.
207
 FOWL's 
constitutional and statutory claims were mostly questions of law and did not require the 
participation of individual members.
208
 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court 
held that to satisfy associational standing not all the members of an association have to 
participate in the suit and the matter does not have to be a pure question of law.
209
 
 
In re Jeffery E. 
In In re Jeffery E.,
210
 the supreme court held that a trial court can find a respondent to be 
gravely disabled even if he or she appears to be functioning at the time of the finding.
211
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Respondent, Jeffery, was in a catatonic state – not eating, drinking, or sleeping – for 
several days.
212
 His family brought him to a hospital and after he was put on medication, 
his condition improved.
213
 Jeffery, however, lacked insight into his prior condition and 
his doctors feared that if he were released he would go off his medication and return to a 
catatonic state.
214
 The hospital filed a petition for an involuntary thirty-day 
commitment.
215
 At the hearing, Jeffery appeared to be “functioning,” yet the superior 
court found him to be gravely disabled.
216
 Reviewing the superior court’s decision for 
clear error, the supreme court upheld the finding.
217
 The court reasoned that recent 
behavior is probative as to whether a respondent is gravely disabled and that a 
determination of gravely disabled is forward-looking.
218
 Because Jeffery had very 
recently experienced catatonia and because it was likely that his catatonia could reoccur 
in the near future, the superior court did not err in finding Jeffery to be gravely 
disabled.
219
 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a trial court can find 
a respondent to be gravely disabled even if he or she appears to be functioning at the time 
of the finding.
220
   
 
Smith v. State 
In Smith v. State,
221
 the supreme court held that statutes of limitations apply to 
constitutional claims.
222
 Smith filed a takings action against the State over twenty-five 
years after a sawmill he operated on United States Forest Service property was acquired 
by the State and conveyed to a third party.
223
 The lower court dismissed Smith’s claim, 
finding that under any statute of limitations the claim would be time-barred.
224
 On appeal, 
Smith argued that statutes of limitations cannot bar claims involving constitutional 
rights.
225
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that statutes of 
limitations apply to all civil claims.
226
 The court further reasoned that the continuing 
violation doctrine was inapplicable because Smith did not allege any ongoing series of 
incidents.
227
 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that statutes of limitations 
apply to constitutional claims.
228
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Thompson v. Cooper 
In Thompson v. Cooper,
229
 the supreme court held that expert opinions based on practical 
experience in the relevant field are not subject to Daubert analysis.
230
 Cooper crashed his 
truck into Thompson’s truck and Thompson subsequently filed suit.231 At trial, 
Thompson moved to offer the testimony of one his physicians regarding the back pain he 
experienced since the accident.
232
 The testimony consisted of the physician inferring, 
based on Thompson’s statements that his symptoms began after the accident, that he was 
injured in the accident.
233
 The superior court excluded the evidence, reasoning that it was 
merely a common sense inference and not expert testimony.
234
 On appeal, Cooper 
insisted that the testimony should be kept out because it would fail a Daubert analysis.
235
 
The supreme court reversed, explaining that Daubert analysis only applies to expert 
testimony based on technical or scientific research.
236
 Another acceptable form of expert 
testimony is testimony based on experience, to which Daubert does not apply.
237
 In 
Thompson’s case, the physician was an experience-based expert who had substantial 
experience with injuries similar to Thompson’s.238 Because causation was a central issue 
and the exclusion of the testimony could have had a substantial effect on the verdict, the 
supreme court held that the testimony should have been admitted.
239
 Reversing, the 
supreme court held that expert opinions based on practical experience in the relevant field 
are not subject to Daubert analysis.
240
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Andrews v. State 
In Andrews v. State,
241
 the court of appeals held that the testimony of a nurse who 
performed a sexual assault examination on a victim is admissible even without pre-trial 
notice where the defendant knows the nurse may testify and does not argue that he is 
surprised by the content of her testimony.
242
 Andrews was charged with second-degree 
sexual assault for engaging in sexual penetration of T.P. while she was incapacitated.
243
 
Prior to trial, the State did not list the nurse who examined T.P. as an expert witness.
244
 
Andrews moved to preclude the nurse from offering any expert testimony, but the 
superior court judge said he would admit the nurse’s testimony unless Andrews indicated 
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to the judge that he was surprised by the content of the testimony.
245
 Andrews did not 
argue that the content of the nurse’s testimony surprised him.246 On appeal, the court of 
appeals agreed that the testimony should be allowed, reasoning that when a defendant 
was aware of the substance of an expert witness’s testimony, such testimony was 
admissible even without pre-trial notice if there were no unfair surprise.
247
 Affirming the 
superior court, the court of appeals held that the testimony of a nurse who performed a 
sexual assault examination on a victim is admissible even without pre-trial notice where 
the defendant knows the nurse may testify and does not argue that he is surprised by the 
content of her testimony.
248
 
 
Rogers v. State 
In Rogers v. State,
249
 the court of appeals held that evidence of a similar crime committed 
by a third-party in the same general area as the crime allegedly committed by the 
defendant should be excluded unless there is a direct connection between this third-
party’s crime and the defendant’s alleged crime.250 Rogers was charged with shooting 
three people, and was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of 
attempted first-degree murder.
251
 On appeal, Rogers argued that he should have been 
allowed to present evidence that a similar crime occurred in the same general area that 
could have cast doubt on his guilt concerning the shootings.
252
 The court of appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing that this evidence was too speculative.253 
The court reasoned that witness testimony regarding a light-colored sedan and a man in 
dark clothing at both crime scenes did not provide sufficient reason to believe that that 
man, not Rogers, committed both crimes.
254
 Affirming the lower court, the court of 
appeals held that evidence of a similar crime committed by a third-party in the same 
general area as the crime allegedly committed by the defendant should be excluded 
unless there is a direct connection between this third-party’s crime and the defendant’s 
alleged crime.
255
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
top  
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
United States v. Henry 
In United States v. Henry,
256
 the Ninth Circuit held that the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms does not extend to possession of a homemade machine gun.
257
 Officers seized 
a loaded assault rifle that had been converted into a machine gun by Henry.
258
 Henry was 
convicted by a jury for knowingly possessing a machine gun in district court.
259
 Henry 
appealed, arguing in part that the Second Amendment protected his right to possess a 
homemade machine gun in his home.
260
 Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that machine 
guns are not protected by the Second Amendment.
261
 The court reasoned that machine 
guns are highly dangerous and unusual weapons, and that every circuit court to address 
the issue has held that the Second Amendment does not protect such weapons.
262
 
Affirming the lower court, the Ninth Circuit held that the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms does not extend to possession of a homemade machine gun.
263
 
 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
 
Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc. 
In Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.,
 264
 the district court held that it may be in the 
public interest to enjoin protests from taking place around sea vessels.
265
 Shell Oil 
Company (“Shell”) filed a motion to enjoin Greenpeace from engaging in certain illegal 
acts at sea against Shell vessels.
266
  Shell submitted evidence that it was under threat of 
injury due to Greenpeace’s “Stop Shell” campaign, which could be found over web pages 
and other materials.
267
 Greenpeace did not indicate that the organization would not 
attempt tortious or unlawful acts against Shell.
268
 The court found that Shell had shown 
that it was likely Greenpeace would engage in these acts, and moved on to determine 
whether it was constitutional to enjoin protests in safety zones around Shell’s vessels.269 
The court held that such an injunction was proper, noting that public sidewalks are the 
quintessential example of a public forum, while the ports and seas of the United States 
are not such a forum.
270
 Instead, the court explained that there is a significant public 
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interest in the safe operation of marine commerce in these areas.
271
 Thus, the court held 
that it may be in the public interest to enjoin protests from taking place around sea 
vessels.
272
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers v. Kenai Peninsula Borough 
In Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,
273
 the supreme court 
held that (1) voter approval was not required to increase sales taxes to three percent due 
to prior voter approval of a sales tax of up to three percent, and (2) an ordinance requiring 
voter approval for capital projects costing more than one million dollars violated the 
Alaska Constitution.
274
 In 2005, the Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly (“Borough”) 
enacted an ordinance raising the sales tax rate from two to three percent, and the 
Borough’s voters passed an initiative requiring voter approval for any capital projects 
costing over one million dollars.
275
 The Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers (“ACT”) 
brought suit in superior court challenging the sales tax increase and seeking enforcement 
of the voter initiative, but the superior court granted summary judgment to the Borough 
on each matter.
276
 On appeal, the ACT argued that the ordinance increasing sales tax was 
not permissible under AS 29.45.670 because it had not been approved by voters, and that 
the ordinance requiring voter approval of capital projects did not violate the Alaska 
Constitution because it did not explicitly make or repeal any appropriation.
277
 The 
supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the sales tax ordinance was valid because voters 
had authorized an increase of up to three percent in 1964 and that defeat of a 2006 
referendum which would have repealed the increase constituted further ratification.
278
 As 
to the second ordinance, the court determined that requiring voter approval for all capital 
projects with costs exceeding one million dollars was invalid because this action would 
compromise the Borough’s ability to utilize resources and allocate funds for competing 
uses effectively.
279
 Affirming, the supreme court held that (1) voter approval was not 
required to increase sales taxes to three percent due to prior voter consent of a sales tax of 
up to three percent, and (2) an ordinance requiring voter approval for capital projects 
costing more than one million dollars violated the Alaska Constitution.
280
 
 
Holiday Alaska, Inc. v. State, Division of Corporations 
In Holiday Alaska, Inc. v. State, Division of Corporations,
281
 the supreme court held that 
a state statute does not violate due process by imposing fines on a store licensed to sell 
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tobacco when an employee is convicted of selling tobacco to a minor.
282
 Holiday Alaska, 
Inc. (“Holiday”) was licensed to sell tobacco in stores across Alaska, but five stores were 
cited for illegally selling tobacco to minors, each incident resulting in a conviction of the 
employee.
283
 The superior court upheld the decision of an Administrative Law Judge to 
impose a $300 civil penalty and license suspension, concluding that Holiday was unable 
to rebut the statutory presumption of negligence established by the convictions.
284
 
Holiday challenged the statute under which the stores were charged, arguing that it 
violated due process because it denied a meaningful hearing and prevented the defendant 
from challenging the presumption of negligence on the part of the company.
285
 The 
supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the amended version of the statute actually 
improved procedural protections and did in fact allow the licensee to challenge the 
presumption of negligence.
286
 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a 
state statute does not violate due process by imposing fines on a store licensed to sell 
tobacco when an employee is convicted of selling tobacco to a minor.
287
 
 
Khan v. State 
In Khan v. State,
288
 the supreme court held that the Alaska Constitution requires that, in 
order to convict a defendant, a jury agree unanimously on the specific criminal conduct 
committed by a defendant.
289
 Kahn was charged with one count of perjury for allegedly 
making four false statements on a financial document.
290
 Kahn claimed he did not make 
the false statements knowingly.
291
 The superior court instructed the jury that to find Kahn 
guilty of perjury, the jurors did not all have to agree as to which statements were false, all 
that was necessary was that each juror find him guilty with respect to at least one 
statement.
292
 Kahn was convicted and his conviction was affirmed by the court of 
appeals.
293
 Kahn appealed, arguing that a unanimous jury verdict is a constitutional 
right.
294
 Reversing, the supreme court held that jury unanimity is required, and explained 
that jury unanimity means that jurors must all agree as to the defendant’s guilt and 
specific criminal conduct.
295
 The court further noted that jurors can disagree as to 
alternate theories of a crime, but not as to alternate crimes.
296
 The court concluded the 
Alaska Constitution’s due process protects the criminal defendant’s right to have jurors 
unanimously agree on the specific underlying criminal conduct.
297
 Reversing the court of 
appeals, the supreme court held that the Alaska Constitution requires that, in order to 
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convict a defendant, a jury agree unanimously on the specific criminal conduct 
committed by a defendant.
298
 
 
Larson v. State, Department of Corrections 
In Larson v. State, Dep’t of Corr.,299 the supreme court held that prison officials must 
provide reasonable accommodation to a prisoner’s serious medical needs to avoid 
deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and such accommodation 
may not be satisfied by medical testing alone.
300
 Larson was incarcerated and claimed to 
suffer from paruresis, a condition that makes it extremely difficult to urinate in the 
presence of others.
301
 He complained repeatedly to prison officials about the pain he 
endured during mandatory urinalysis tests in which he was forced to urinate in the 
presence of a guard.
302
 Larson’s grievances were denied and, acting pro se, he filed suit 
against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.
303
 The superior court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that 
the fact that the officials had ordered medical evaluations of Larson’s condition showed 
they were not deliberately indifferent.
304
 On appeal, the supreme court reversed and 
remanded, holding that inconclusive medical testing of a prisoner does not, in itself, 
avoid the possibility of deliberate indifference.
305
 The supreme court held that prison 
officials must provide reasonable accommodation to a prisoner’s serious medical needs to 
avoid deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and such 
accommodation may not be satisfied by medical testing alone.
306
 
 
Ross v. State, Department of Revenue 
In Ross v. State, Department of Revenue,
307
 the supreme court held that the Alaska statute 
disqualifying anyone who was absent for ten consecutive years from the state from 
receiving dividends is constitutional.
308
 Ross was absent from the state since 1990, but 
maintained Alaska residency and received a permanent fund dividend each year.
309
 In 
1998, the Alaska Legislature amended the dividend qualifications to provide that anyone 
who was allowably absent for ten consecutive years would no longer be eligible for 
dividends.
310
 Ross was absent for ten consecutive years, and was thus denied of dividend 
payment.
311
 Ross appealed and the denial was upheld at an informal agency appeal, a 
formal agency appeal, and by the superior court.
312
 The supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s judgment, reasoning that the ten-year rule is fairly and substantially 
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related to the legitimate state interests of limiting dividends to permanent Alaska 
residents and preventing fraud and also the ten-year rule is rationally related to the 
legitimate state purpose of reducing administrative burdens.
313
 Thus, affirming the 
superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that the Alaska statute disqualifying 
anyone who was absent for ten consecutive years from the state from receiving dividends 
is constitutional.
314
 
 
CONTRACT LAW 
top  
 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
 
Millo v. Delius 
In Millo v. Delius,
315
 the district court held that adult children are not presumed to be 
dependents under Alaska’s wrongful death statute.316  Bret Millo was fatally shot during a 
guided hunting trip by another hunter.
317
 His wife filed a complaint claiming the hunter 
acted with reckless indifference seeking, in part, wrongful death damages for her adult 
daughters.
318
  The issue before the court was whether Millo’s three adult daughters could 
be considered statutory beneficiaries under Alaska’s wrongful death statute.319  The court 
granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the three daughters were 
economically independent from their father and thus not statutory beneficiaries.
320
 The 
court recognized that generally Alaska’s wrongful death statute presumes a surviving 
spouse or minor child of the victim is a dependent, whereas dependency must be 
established for all other individuals.
321
 Granting summary judgment to the defendant, the 
court held that adult children are not presumed to be dependents under Alaska’s wrongful 
death statute.
322
   
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Alaska Interstate Construction, LLC v. Pacific Diversified Investments, Inc. 
In Alaska Interstate Construction, LLC v. Pacific Diversified Investments, Inc.,
323
 the 
supreme court held that where there are claims for violations of the Unfair Trade 
Practices Act (“UTPA”), such claims can only be preempted by laws which specifically 
address the conduct at issue.
324
 Pacific Diversified Investments (“PDI”) entered into an 
agreement to lease two aircraft to Alaska Interstate Construction (“AIC”) for an hourly 
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fee.
325
 Subsequently, without prior approval, PDI began charging monthly fees to AIC for 
the use of one aircraft, resulting in overpayments.
326
 At trial, the jury found that PDI 
committed unfair and deceptive acts under the UTPA, awarding AIC $7.3 million in 
damages.
327
 The superior court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) 
nullifying the $7.3 million award, concluding that the conduct was exempt from the 
UTPA because it dealt with aviation, an industry regulated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”).328 Reversing, the supreme court held that that the superior court 
erroneously granted a JNOV because the UTPA was not exempted by other aviation 
laws.
329
 The supreme court reasoned that regulations under FAA law focus on aviation 
safety, not aircraft leasing, and without regulations specifically regulating the activity at 
issue, the UTPA would not be exempted.
330
 Reversing, the supreme court held that where 
there are claims for violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”), such claims 
can only be preempted by laws which specifically address the conduct at issue.
331
 
 
Kiernan v. Creech 
In Kiernan v. Creech,
332
 the supreme court held that, despite the statute of frauds, a party 
may invoke promissory estoppel and part performance to enforce an oral agreement if the 
party materially relied on the agreement to his or her detriment.
333
 Kiernan and Creech 
each owned separate towing companies and entered an oral agreement to share a lot out 
of which to operate their separate businesses.
334
 Because Kiernan owed money to the 
IRS, the lot was placed exclusively in Creech’s name.335 Kiernan split the expenses for 
the lot, paying half of all the associated costs.
336
 Kiernan, however, continued to 
experience problems with the IRS.
337
 Kiernan and Creech’s relationship soured and 
Kiernan brought suit against Creech.
338
 The lower court dismissed Kiernan’s claims, 
holding that the statute of frauds bars oral co-ownership agreements and no exception to 
the statute of frauds applies.
339
 The supreme court reversed, reasoning that if Kiernan was 
able to prove the terms of the oral agreement by clear and convincing evidence then the 
oral agreement may be specific enough to support promissory estoppel.
340
 The court also 
reasoned that the part performance exception to the statute of frauds may be available 
when a party significantly changes its position in reliance on the oral agreement.
341
 
Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that, despite the statute of frauds, a 
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party may invoke promissory estoppel and part performance to enforce an oral agreement 
if the party materially relied on the agreement to his or her detriment.
342
 
 
Perotti v. Corrections Corp. of America 
In Perotti v. Corrections Corp. of America,
343
 the supreme court held that a prisoner does 
not have the right to receive monetary damages for breach of contract under the Cleary 
Final Settlement Agreement.
344
 Perotti was a prisoner in the Alaska Department of 
Corrections (“DOC”) and contested the ramifications of violation of the Cleary 
Settlement.
345
 The Cleary Settlement provides that if overcrowding occurs in the prisons, 
then the DOC must present a plan to the superior court to reduce the population of 
prisoners.
346
 Perotti was placed in segregated housing.
347
 He filed a claim against the 
Corrections Corporation, alleging that it was in breach of the terms of its contract during 
the time that Perotti had been segregated.
348
 The lower court held that Perotti, as a third-
party beneficiary, lacked standing to bring the claim.
349
 Affirming the lower court, the 
supreme court reasoned that, as a Cleary class member and third-party beneficiary, 
Perotti was not entitled to damages.
350
 The court reasoned that Perotti would not be 
entitled to compensatory, liquidated, or punitive damages because these damages do not 
extend to third-party beneficiaries under contract law.
351
 Therefore, affirming the lower 
court, the supreme court held that a prisoner does not have the right to receive monetary 
damages for breach of contract under the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement.
352
   
 
CRIMINAL LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
McGraw v. Cox 
In McGraw v. Cox,
353
 the supreme court held that threats amounting to attempted 
coercion are sufficient to justify a domestic violence protective order.
354
 When Cox and 
McGraw’s relationship ended, Cox was granted a temporary domestic violence order, and 
then sought a long-term domestic violence protective order on the basis that McGraw had 
coerced her with various threats that would jeopardize her ongoing custody dispute with 
her ex-husband.
355
 The superior court granted the order, finding that McGraw’s 
threatened to reveal information that Cox had “brainwashed” her children and allowed 
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one child to fondle her breasts.
356
 McGraw appealed, arguing there was insufficient 
evidence to support the finding.
357
 The supreme court found that McGraw did not commit 
the crime of coercion because Cox was never compelled to act in response to the threats; 
however, the court held his actions constituted an attempt to coerce Cox, which was 
sufficient to support a domestic violence protective order.
358
 Affirming the lower court, 
the supreme court held that threats amounting to attempted coercion are sufficient to 
justify a domestic violence protective order.
359
 
 
Nelson v. State 
In Nelson v. State,
360
 the supreme court held that a defense counsel’s invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during a post-conviction relief 
proceeding based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not, by itself, rebut 
the presumption of counsel’s competence or shift the burden of proof to the defense.361 
Nelson was convicted by a jury of five counts of sexual abuse of minors and his 
convictions were upheld on appeal.
362
 He retained new counsel and filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief, alleging thirty-five counts of ineffective assistance of counsel.
363
 
Nelson’s former counsel invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and refused to answer questions for a required affidavit supporting 
Nelson’s claim.364 The superior court subsequently dismissed thirty-four counts in 
Nelson’s petition.365 The court of appeals upheld the decision, and asserted that no 
adverse inference could be drawn from the former counsel’s invocation of privilege.366 
On appeal, the supreme court held that a defense counsel’s invocation of Fifth 
Amendment privilege in a post-conviction proceeding will not generally give rise to an 
adverse inference, but that it may give rise to a permissible adverse inference if he refuses 
to testify against specific evidence offered against him.
367
 Affirming, the supreme court 
held that a defense counsel’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination during a post-conviction relief proceeding based on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel does not by itself rebut the presumption of counsel’s competence or 
shift the burden of proof to the defense.
368
 
 
Rofkar v. State 
In Rofkar v. State,
369
 the supreme court held that Alaska’s double jeopardy clause may be 
violated if a defendant receives separate convictions for possessing drugs and for 
                                                 
356
 Id. 
357
 Id. at 277. 
358
 Id. at 280. 
359
 Id. at 279−81. 
360
 273 P.3d 608 (Alaska 2012). 
361
 Id. at 611–12. 
362
 Id. at 610. 
363
 Id. 
364
 Id. 
365
 Id. 
366
 Id. at 611. 
367
 Id. at 611–12.  
368
 Id.  
369
 273 P.3d 1140 (Alaska 2012). 
 27 
maintaining a dwelling or building to keep those same drugs.
370
 Rofkar was arrested and 
charged with four felony counts: manufacturing one ounce or more of marijuana, 
possessing marijuana of one pound or more, possessing twenty-five or more marijuana 
plants, and maintaining a dwelling for the keeping of a controlled substance.
371
 The court 
of appeals merged the first three claims, but refused to merge the maintaining charge with 
the other three, leaving Rofkar with two felony charges.
372
 Rofkar raised the issue of 
double jeopardy on appeal, but did not argue that the controlling precedent should be 
overruled or distinguished until his reply brief.
373
 The court of appeals thus refused to 
hear the double jeopardy issue on the merits.
374
 The supreme court vacated the court of 
appeals’ decision and remanded, reasoning that the court of appeal’s categorical approach 
to double jeopardy in possession/maintaining crimes may violate case law and 
constitutional law.
375
 Vacating and remanding, the supreme court held that Alaska’s 
double jeopardy clause may be violated if a defendant receives separate convictions for 
possessing drugs and for maintaining a dwelling or building to keep those same drug.
376
 
 
State v. Corbett 
In State v. Corbett,
377
 the supreme court held that an immunized witness does not retain 
the ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, and the accompanying right 
to refuse to testify, based on the possibility that the witness may be prosecuted for 
committing perjury during that immunized testimony.
378
 Corbett was accused of 
strangling his son Dupri.
379
 Dupri was granted immunity but refused to testify, invoking 
his privilege against self-incrimination under both the Alaska Constitution and the United 
States Constitution.
380
 The superior court found that because Dupri intended to testify 
that his father had not assaulted him, and the State would likely find such testimony 
perjurious, then Dupri could refuse to testify due to the risk of self-incrimination.
381
 The 
supreme court held that while immunity is intended to shield witnesses from offering 
perjuries testimony and self-incrimination, immunity does not protect witnesses from 
future perjury, and thus a witness that has been granted immunity cannot refuse to 
testify.
382
 Reversing, the supreme court held that an immunized witness does not retain 
the ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, and the accompanying right 
to refuse to testify, based on the possibility that the witness may be prosecuted for 
committing perjury during that immunized testimony.
383
 
 
 
                                                 
370
 Id. at 1143. 
371
 Id.at 1141. 
372
 Id.  
373
 Id. 
374
 Id. 
375
 Id. at1143. 
376
 Id. 
377
 286 P.3d 772 (Alaska 2012). 
378
 Id. at 774. 
379
 Id. at 773.  
380
 Id.  
381
 Id. at 773–74.  
382
 Id. at 776.  
383
 Id. 
 28 
State v. Gibson 
In State v. Gibson,
384
 the supreme court held that the police may have reasonable belief 
that a warrantless search is necessary where (1) the police respond to a domestic violence 
call and find that serious violence has occurred, and (2) it is unclear whether all injured 
parties are accounted for.
385
 Gibson’s girlfriend called 911 and told police Gibson was 
threatening to stab her.
386
 When police arrived at Gibson’s trailer, they detained both 
known parties, and then entered the trailer to determine if there were any injured 
parties.
387
 Upon entry, police discovered evidence of methamphetamine 
manufacturing.
388
 Gibson was convicted of methamphetamine related charges after a 
motion to suppress the evidence of the meth lab was overruled.
389
 Vacating, the court of 
appeals concluded that the police did not have an objectively reasonable belief of 
emergency when they searched the trailer.
390
 Reversing, the supreme court concluded that 
the court of appeals took a narrower view of what constitutes an emergency than Alaska 
law requires, and held that it is sufficient if the police have good reason to believe there 
might be someone injured on the premises.
391
 The court reasoned that the police have 
wide latitude when acting out of safety concerns, particularly when the situation involves 
violence.
392
 Reversing, the supreme court held that the police may have reasonable belief 
that a warrantless search is necessary where (1) the police respond to a domestic violence 
call and find that serious violence has occurred, and (2) it is unclear whether all injured 
parties are accounted for.
393
   
 
Yi v. Yang 
In Yi v. Yang,
394
 the supreme court held that when a police officer has probable cause to 
instigate a felony arrest, any procedural deficiencies in a corresponding citizen’s arrest 
are irrelevant.
395
 Police officers reported to a premise after numerous emergency phone 
calls by several individuals.
396
 Though testimony was inconsistent, it was determined that 
the manager of the premises had served eviction papers on Yi.
397
 As the manager was 
leaving the premises, Yi used a broom handle to break the front and back windows of the 
manager’s vehicle, and also struck the manager’s wrist and broke his wristwatch.398 The 
manager said that he was in fear for his life, and the police detained Yi as part of a 
citizen’s arrest.399 Yi challenged the citizen’s arrest, and argued that he was falsely 
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arrested because it had not met procedural standards.
400
 The superior court granted 
summary judgment and dismissed the suit in favor of the police, reasoning that the arrest 
was justified by probable cause that Yi had committed or was committing a felony, 
regardless of the fact that Yi was actually detained in a citizen’s arrest.401 The supreme 
court affirmed the lower court and held that when a police officer has probable cause to 
instigate a felony arrest, any procedural deficiencies in a corresponding citizen’s arrest 
are irrelevant.
402
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Ahvakana v. State 
In Ahvakana v. State,
403
 the court of appeals held that warrantless entry is justified when 
police reasonably believe there is an emergency and immediate need for assistance.
404
 
The police responded to a domestic violence report.
405
 Black answered the door with cuts 
and blood on her face, and she told the police that Ahvakana was not there.
406
 Police then 
entered the home and arrested Ahvakana who was hiding in a closet.
407
 At trial, 
Ahvakana was convicted of fourth-degree assault.
408
 Ahvakana appealed, arguing that the 
police had committed a warrantless entry.
409
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that 
warrantless entries such as the entry in this case are justified when performed under the 
emergency aid exception.
410
 The court noted that the exception requires police to have 
reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need 
for their assistance for the protection of life or property.
411
 The court reasoned that police 
had reasonable ground to enter because the police were responding to complaints of 
yelling and crying, Black answered the door with cuts, and a concern existed that there 
might be other victims.
412
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that warrantless entry is 
justified when police reasonably believe there is an emergency and immediate need for 
assistance.
413
 
 
Bachmeier v. State 
In Bachmeier v. State,
414
 the court of appeals held that an inmate’s self-defense claim 
requires a showing that the inmate reasonably believed an officer was about to strike him 
without justification.
415
 Bachmeier was moving laundry when a corrections officer 
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demanded some materials in the laundry basket.
416
 A physical confrontation ensued, and 
Bachmeier claimed self-defense.
417
 Bachmeier was convicted of assault.
 418
  On appeal, 
the court of appeals held that for an inmate to prove they were acting in self-defense, they 
do not need to show that the officer was using unlawful force against them.
419
 Rather, the 
court noted that a reasonable belief that the unlawful use of force is imminent would meet 
the requirements for a self-defense claim.
420
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the 
court of appeals held that an inmate’s self-defense claim requires a showing that the 
inmate reasonably believed an officer was about to strike him without justification.
421
  
 
Benson v. State 
In Benson v. State,
422
 the court of appeals held that it is not plain error a court to refuse to 
appoint conflict counsel, sua sponte, to a defendant in proceedings to determine whether 
the defendant is financially qualified for court-appointed counsel.
423
 Benson was charged 
with misconduct involving a controlled substance in the third degree.
424
 At his 
arraignment, upon Benson’s request, a superior court judge appointed the Office of 
Public Advocacy to represent Benson.
425
 However, the Office of Public Advocacy filed 
two motions in superior court to withdraw from representation of Benson on the grounds 
that he was financially ineligible for representation.
426
 The superior court judge 
determined that Benson was financially capable of paying for an attorney and granted the 
second motion.
427
 Benson subsequently represented himself at trial and was convicted.
428
 
On appeal, Benson argued that the determination of his eligibility for appointed counsel 
was a critical stage of the proceedings against him, and therefore both the United States 
and Alaska Constitutions gave him a right to court-appointed counsel as an indigent 
defendant.
429
 The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that applicable case law did not 
support his assertion that this determination was a critical stage of the proceedings 
against him.
430
 Moreover, the court found that because Benson did not argue in superior 
court that he was constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel in superior court, 
the issue could only be reviewed for plain error.
431
 Affirming, the court of appeals held 
that it is not plain error a court to refuse to appoint conflict counsel, sua sponte, to a 
defendant in proceedings to determine whether the defendant is financially qualified for 
court-appointed counsel.
432
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Christian v. State 
In Christian v. State,
433
 the court of appeals held that defendants have no constitutional 
right to serve as co-counsel in their own trials or to receive hybrid representation when 
they are represented by counsel.
434
 Christian was sentenced to 106 years in prison for 
various charges.
435
 At trial, the judge rejected Christian’s requests to serve as co-counsel 
in his trial and to personally deliver the opening statement because (1) he did not have 
sufficient time to efficiently conduct the necessary research; and (2) he would be 
permitted to make statements about the case without taking the stand and undergoing 
cross-examination.
436
 Reviewing for clear error, the court of appeals upheld the trial 
judge’s decision.437 Noting the distinction between pro se defendants seeking assistance 
from counsel and defendants that are represented by counsel but who desire to serve as 
co-counsel, the court of appeals held that defendants like Christian have a lesser need for 
hybrid representation and that trial judges can take various factors, including timeliness, 
into consideration when deciding such requests.
438
 Affirming, the court of appeals held 
that defendants have no constitutional right to serve as co-counsel in their own trials or to 
receive hybrid representation when they are represented by counsel. 
439
 
 
Collins v. State 
In Collins v. State,
440
 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s case should be referred 
to a three-judge sentencing panel if the defendant can sufficiently demonstrate that he 
does not have a history of unprosecuted sexual offenses, or that the he has “normal” or 
“good” prospects for rehabilitation.441 Collins was convicted of first-degree sexual assault 
and sentenced to twenty years of incarceration.
442
 In 2006, the legislature had increased 
the sentencing ranges for sexual offenders, and Collins was subject to a sentencing range 
of twenty to thirty years.
443
 In order to avoid the presumptive minimum, Collins asked the 
judge to send his case to a three-judge panel but his request was denied.
444
 Reversing, the 
court of appeals held that defendants convicted of sex offenses should be able to obtain 
referrals to the three-judge sentencing panel if they refute that they are atypically 
dangerous, and that they have atypically poor prospects for rehabilitation.
445
 The court 
reasoned that the legislature’s choice of presumptive sentencing range depended on 
underlying assumptions, and that a defendant able to refute such assumptions may 
receive sentencing from a panel.
446
 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that a 
defendant’s case should be referred to a three-judge panel if the defendant can show that 
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he does not have a history of unprosecuted sexual offenses, or that the he has “normal” 
prospects for rehabilitation.
447
 
 
Dickie v. State 
In Dickie v. State,
448
 the court of appeals held that the statutory definition of 
“nonconsensual” does not require an element of coercion or force.449 Dickie knocked on 
the front door of the Petersens’ house one night holding a bag of beer and asking for 
someone named Sherry.
450
 They informed him that nobody of that name lived there, but 
over the next several weeks he kept returning to put food on their front porch.
451
 The 
Petersons warned Dickie that they would call the police if he returned.
452
 Later, when the 
family saw Dickie enter their yard and crouch down with a large gun, Mr. Petersen called 
the police, who apprehended Dickie at his home.
453
 Dickie was convicted of three 
charges, including a count of first-degree stalking.
454
 On appeal, Dickie contended that 
the definition of “nonconsensual” used by the stalking statute was unconstitutionally 
broad and required an element of coercion or force.
455
 The court of appeals disagreed 
with Dickie, reasoning that his first visit to the Petersens’ residence, during which he was 
informed that nobody named Sherry lived at the home, was sufficient notice that any 
continued contact with the family would be without their consent.
456
 Affirming the lower 
court, the court of appeals held that the statutory definition of “nonconsensual” does not 
require an element of coercion or force.
457
 
 
Eberhardt v. State 
In Eberhardt v. State,
458
 the court of appeals held that the date of deferred prosecution 
does not count as the date of prior conviction for purposes of the felony DUI statute.
459
 In 
1994, Eberhardt was accepted into a deferred prosecution program following his first 
DUI charge in Washington.
460
 In 2004, he was convicted of the DUI after he violated the 
terms of the program.
461
 In 2009, the superior court convicted him of felony DUI because 
he had two prior DUI convictions within the preceding ten years, counting the 2004 
conviction rather than the 1994 deferred prosecution.
462
 He appealed arguing that the 
1994 order accepting him into deferred prosecution program qualified as a conviction, 
outside of the ten-year look-back period for felony DUI.
463
 Affirming the superior court, 
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the court of appeals found that the statute and previous court decisions did not consider a 
deferred prosecution as a conviction.
464
 The court held that a formal finding of guilt was 
not entered until 2004.
465
 Thus, the court of appeals held that the date of deferred 
prosecution does not count as the date of prior conviction when deferred prosecution was 
later terminated for purposes of counting prior convictions for a felony DUI charge.
466
 
 
Grossman v. State 
In Grossman v. State,
467
 the court of appeals held that a DUI arrestee’s right to contact an 
attorney before consenting to a breath test does not permit the defendant to interrupt the 
testing process after the fifteen minute pre-test observation period.
468
 Grossman was 
arrested for driving under the influence and was taken to the police station for a breath 
test.
469
 An officer informed Grossman of his right to contact an attorney at the beginning 
of the fifteen minute pre-test observation period, but Grossman made no calls.
470
 
Grossman was subsequently uncooperative in providing an adequate breath sample.
471
 At 
the point the officer was prepared to charge Grossman with breath test refusal, Grossman 
requested that he be able to contact an attorney, further interrupting the test.
472
 The 
officer refused and charged Grossman with both DUI and the crime of breath test 
refusal.
473
 On appeal, Grossman argued that the officer violated his rights by refusing to 
interrupt the breath test to allow Grossman to contact an attorney.
474
 The court of appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that a DUI arrestee’s right to contact an 
attorney before consenting to a breath test does not permit the defendant to interrupt the 
testing process after the fifteen minute pre-test observation period.
475
 
 
Harvey v. State 
In Harvey v State,
476
 the court of appeals held that privately retained attorneys, like court- 
appointed attorneys, must engage in meaningful consultation with a defendant when the 
defendant demonstrates an interest in pursuing an appeal or when the attorney should 
reasonably know that a rational defendant would want to appeal.
477
 Harvey was 
sentenced for sexual abuse, and claimed to engage in discussion with his counsel about 
pursuing an appeal, but his counsel took no action following the sentencing.
478
  Harvey 
petitioned the superior court for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective 
counsel from his attorney, but the superior court denied Harvey's petition, and Harvey 
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appealed.
479
 The court of appeals held that privately retained attorneys are held to the 
same standard as court-appointed attorneys, and thus Harvey’s attorney did not have a 
lessor obligation to engage in meaningful consultation with Harvey about the possibility 
of seeking post-judgment remedies.
480
 Reversing the superior court, the court of appeals 
held that privately retained attorneys, like court- appointed attorneys, must engage in 
meaningful consultation with a defendant when the defendant demonstrates an interest in 
pursuing an appeal or when the attorney should reasonably know that a rational defendant 
would want to appeal.
481
 
 
Johnson v. State 
In Johnson v. State,
482
 the court of appeals held that prior specific acts of violence may be 
admissible where they are introduced to show the reasonableness of another party’s use 
of defensive force.
483
 Johnson was charged with, among other things, attempted first-
degree murder for cutting three individuals, including Moulder, with a box cutter.
484
 At 
trial, Johnson claimed self-defense against all three victims.
485
 The superior court did not 
allow Johnson to introduce evidence of Moulder’s statement that he had attacked a 
neighbor the night before.
486
 Johnson appealed.
487
 The court of appeals reversed the 
superior court’s judgment, reasoning that where Johnson was aware of Moulder’s past 
acts of violence, and evidence of those acts of violence was offered to prove the 
reasonableness of Johnson’s use of defensive force, evidence of Moulder’s specific acts 
is not barred.
488
 The court reasoned that the evidence was not being used as character 
evidence but to show the reasonableness of Johnson’s use of defensive force.489 Thus, 
reversing the superior court, the court of appeals held that prior specific acts of violence 
may be admissible where they are introduced to show the reasonableness of another 
party’s use of defensive force.490 
 
Joseph v. State 
In Joseph v. State,
491
 the court of appeals held that separate convictions for first-degree 
sexual assault do not merge when there are distinct types of penetration involved and 
there is a break in time between their occurrences, but convictions for second-degree 
sexual assault can merge with convictions for first-degree sexual assault.
492
 Joseph 
forcibly performed nonconsensual oral sex on his wife.
493
 He then attacked his wife when 
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she began to struggle.
494
 After a period, he then forced her to engage in genital 
intercourse.
495
 Joseph was convicted on three counts of first-degree sexual assault and 
multiple counts of second-degree sexual assault, and he appealed.
496
 Affirming, the court 
of appeals reasoned that the first-degree convictions do not merge because distinct types 
of sexual penetration support separate convictions for sexual assault, and there was a 
break between the penetrations that occurred before and after Joseph was interrupted by 
the children walking into the room.
497
 The court also held that Joseph’s second-degree 
sexual assault convictions merge with his first-degree sexual assault convictions because 
when two sexual acts are performed as part of a single transaction with a single incident 
of sexual penetration, conviction should be based on the most serious contact, which in 
this case is the sexual penetration.
498
 The court of appeals held that separate convictions 
for first-degree sexual assault do not merge when there are distinct types of penetration 
involved and there is a break in time between their occurrences, but convictions for 
second-degree sexual assault can merge with convictions for first-degree sexual 
assault.
499
 
 
Lawrence v. State 
In Lawrence v. State,
500
 the court of appeals held that an individual who steals a container 
can be convicted of stealing the contents of the container even when he or she was 
ignorant of those contents at the time of the taking.
501
 Lawrence stole a purse containing 
the victim’s debit card and social security card.502 AS § 11.81.900(b)(1) defines these 
cards as “access devices,” and stealing them is second-degree theft.503 Lawrence was 
convicted by a jury of two counts for stealing the access devices.
504
 On appeal, she 
argued that the court erred by instructing the jury they could infer Lawrence’s intent to 
steal the contents of the purse based on her theft of the purse itself.
505
 She contended that 
this instruction violated the rule that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
every element of an offence, including the relevant mental states.
506
 The court of appeals 
affirmed the jury’s verdict, reasoning that Alaska precedent and authority from other 
jurisdictions permit conviction under these circumstances when the contents of the 
container are not unusual.
507
 The court declared that when the probable contents of a 
particular kind of container are common knowledge, then the jury may rightly infer from 
a person’s intentional theft of the container that she also intended to steal the contents.508 
The court did not decide whether this rule applies when the container’s contents are 
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unusual.
509
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that an individual who steals a container 
can be convicted of stealing the contents of the container even when he or she was 
ignorant of those contents at the time of the taking.
510
 
 
Maillelle v. State 
In Maillelle v. State,
511
 the court of appeals held that a court can require a defendant 
convicted of a crime to pay restitution to Alaska’s Medicaid program when that program 
has paid for the medical expenses incurred by the victim of the crime.
512
 Maillelle pled 
guilty to second-degree assault after striking her daughter with a truck.
513
 Maillelle’s 
daughter suffered extensive injuries, and incurred nearly $102,000 in medical expenses, 
which were paid for by Alaska’s Medicaid program.514 The superior court ordered 
Maillelle to pay restitution to the state under AS 12.55.045(a).
515
 On appeal, Maillelle 
argues that the state’s Medicaid program was neither a victim of the crime nor a provider 
of medical services, and therefore the statute did not authorize the superior court to order 
her to pay restitution to the program.
516
 The court of appeals disagreed with Maillelle and 
affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that because the program lost money as 
a result of the crime, it was a “victim or other person injured by the offense” within the 
meaning of the statute.
517
 Moreover, the court found that it did not matter that the 
program was not a provider of medical services because the doctors and other staff that 
provided the services were paid for by Medicaid.
518
 Affirming, the court of appeals held 
that a court can require a defendant convicted of a crime to pay restitution to the state’s 
Medicaid program when Medicaid has paid for the medical expenses incurred by the 
victim of the crime.
519
 
 
Milligan v. Alaska  
In Milligan v. Alaska,
520
 the court of appeals held that a witness’ alcohol-related memory 
loss may be used to impeach evidence of her memory.
521
  The victim and a group of 
friends were drinking at a bar when she invited them to drink at her house.
522
 They 
returned to her apartment, where they continued drinking.
523
 The victim later woke up 
and found Milligan on top of her.
524
 The lower court, in a jury trial, held that Milligan 
was guilty of first and second degree sexual assault.
525
 Milligan attempted to introduce 
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evidence that the victim experienced other alcohol-related memory losses near the time of 
this incident, but the trial judge excluded this evidence, and Milligan appealed arguing 
prejudicial error.
526
 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that the court may permit 
evidence of alcohol related memory loss because evidence of a witness’s mental state 
may affect the witness’s ability to recall the events leading up to the incident, and 
therefore may be admitted as evidence of a witness’s sensory capacity.527 Therefore, 
reversing and remanding to the lower court, the court of appeals held that a witness’s 
alcohol-related memory loss may be used to impeach evidence of her memory.
528
 
 
N.G. v. Superior Court 
In N.G. v. Superior Court,
529
 the court of appeals held that an order requiring production 
of all medical records is improper where those records are protected by a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege and the defendant has not shown an overriding interest 
in disclosure or that the patient’s medical history is relevant to the case.530 Standifer was 
charged with sexual assault, attempted sexual assault, and physical assault for an alleged 
attack on N.G.
531
 Because the subsequent examination of N.G. made reference to 
previous alcohol abuse and bipolar disorder, the superior court granted Standifer’s 
request for the production of all of N.G.’s medical treatment records.532 The superior 
court reasoned that it could separate privileged and non-privileged information in those 
records through in camera inspection.
533
 On appeal, N.G. argued that the superior court 
should not have granted Standifer’s request.534 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning 
that it was unlikely that there was any non-privileged information in those records 
because the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to all confidential communications 
made for diagnosis or treatment and to information generated during the psychotherapist-
patient relationship.
535
 Moreover, the court reasoned that even if Alaska’s courts allowed 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege to be overcome if the defendant shows a strong 
interest in disclosure, the superior court did not make any such finding in this case.
536
 
Lastly, the court found that Standifer did not offer any proof that N.G.’s medical history 
would make it more likely that she could not reliably recall facts from the incident, and 
therefore did not support the assertion that an in camera review of N.G.’s history would 
be necessary.
537
 Reversing, the court of appeals held that an order requiring production of 
all medical records is improper where those records are protected by a psychotherapist-
patient privilege and the defendant has not shown an overriding interest in disclosure or 
that the patient’s medical history is relevant to the case.538 
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Oskolkoff v. State 
In Oskolkoff v. State,
539
 the court of appeals held that when a defendant is prosecuted for 
either “repeat” or “habitual” minor consuming, the defendant’s predicate criminal history 
is an element of the offense which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
540
 
A jury convicted Oskolkoff for “habitual minor consuming.”541 On appeal, Oskolkoff 
argued that the lower court erred by determining that a defendant’s prior convictions 
constituted a sentencing factor under AS 04.16.050, rather than an element of the 
offense.
542
 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that under statutes which create 
increased levels of offense for repeat offenders, each level is a separate offense and the 
prior convictions are elements of that offense, unless the legislature clearly indicates 
otherwise.
543
 Subsequently, upon analysis of the legislative history of AS 04.16.050, the 
court found no indication to the contrary.
544
 Reversing the conviction and remanding for 
new trial, the court of appeals held that when a defendant is prosecuted for either “repeat” 
or “habitual” minor consuming, the defendant’s predicate criminal history is an element 
of the offense which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
545
 
 
Pocock v. State 
In Pocock v. State,
546
 the court of appeals held that the “small quantities” mitigator is 
applicable to a drug offense when the quantity of drug sold is uncharacteristically small 
in comparison to the broad middle ground of conduct prohibited by statute.
547
 Pocock 
was convicted of three counts of second-degree controlled substance misconduct for three 
sales of heroin, totaling 0.12 grams.
548
 Because he was a third felony offender, the 
presumptive range for his sentence was 15 to 20 years.
549
 The superior court judge 
rejected Pocock’s argument that the “small quantities” mitigator was applicable to his 
sentence because he concluded that the amounts sold were not small in the context of the 
use of heroin.
550
 On appeal, Pocock argued that the superior court erred by not applying 
this mitigating factor.
551
 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that under Dollison v. 
State,
552
 the question for determining whether the “small quantities” mitigator applies is 
whether the sale falls within the broad middle ground of conduct prohibited by the 
statute.
553
 Next, the court determined that the statute under which Pocock was convicted, 
AS 11.71.020(a)(1), covers the entire spectrum of heroin sales, and that the amount at 
issue in this case was within the least severe sentencing range for sales of heroin under 
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federal law.
554
 Vacating and remanding for resentencing, the court of appeals held that 
the “small quantities” mitigator is applicable to a drug offense when the quantity of drug 
sold is uncharacteristically small in comparison to the broad middle ground of conduct 
prohibited by the statute.
555
 
 
Rogers v. State 
In Rogers v. State,
556
 the court of appeals held that a continuance may be denied when the 
requesting party repeatedly fails to demonstrate diligence in avoiding the continuance.
557
 
Rogers was granted several continuances for his sentencing hearing, the third of which 
was granted so that he could obtain a psychiatric evaluation and diagnosis by a 
psychiatrist licensed in California.
558
 A fourth continuance was later granted, at which 
point Rogers’ attorney understood that Rogers may need to find a different psychiatrist 
for licensing reasons.
559
 Instead, Rogers’ attorney filed a motion attacking the 
constitutionality of the licensing statute.
560
 The superior court found the statute to be 
constitutional and Rogers then asked for a fifth continuance to find another 
psychiatrist.
561
 The superior court denied the motion, finding primarily that Rogers failed 
to show diligence.
562
 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a lack of diligence may 
result in a denial of a continuance.
563
 Given the number of continuances and Rogers’ lack 
of efforts to obtain a temporary permit or a new psychiatrist, the court of appeals 
agreed.
564
 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that a continuance may 
be denied when the requesting party repeatedly fails to demonstrate diligence in avoiding 
the continuance.
565
 
 
Ruaro v. State of Alaska 
In Ruaro v. State of Alaska,
566
 the court of appeals held that evidence provided at a search 
warrant hearing, including potential past criminal activity, inconsistent statements about a 
package’s contents, and emotional and angry actions by a suspect, was insufficient to 
establish probable cause that the package contained cocaine.
567
 A supervisor at a shipping 
facility notified the police that a suspicious package had arrived at the facility for 
Ruaro.
568
 The supervisor reported that Ruaro had been angry at a delay in a previous 
shipment, and that his pattern of receiving abnormally taped packages was unusual.
569
 
Ruaro refused to allow the police to search the box and also provided inconsistent 
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information as to the shipper of the box and the box’s contents.570 Additionally, the 
trooper testified that after they received phone calls regarding Ruaro’s alleged 
involvement with drugs approximately two years prior, the police interviewed him and he 
denied having any involvement in selling drugs.
571
 The magistrate found probable cause 
to issue the warrant, and the trooper found one hundred grams of cocaine hidden inside of 
the box.
572
 Ruaro moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the warrant was not 
supported by probable cause.
573
 The superior court found that it was reasonable for the 
magistrate to conclude that Ruaro’s behavior was suspicious; however, his suspicious 
behavior coupled with the Crime Stoppers report did not establish probable cause that his 
package contained cocaine.
574
  Reversing the superior court’s decision to deny the motion 
to suppress evidence obtained from the warrant, the court of appeals held that evidence 
provided at a search warrant hearing, including potential past criminal activity, 
inconsistent statements about the package’s contents, and emotional and angry actions by 
a suspect was insufficient to establish probable cause that the package contained 
cocaine.
575
 
 
Scholes v. State 
In Scholes v. State,
576
 the court of appeals held that (1) intentional causation of extreme 
pain during a sexual assault was sufficient to establish the aggravator deliberate 
cruelty,
577
 and (2) the fact that conduct could have supported multiple convictions 
establishes the aggravator that the conduct is among the most serious within the 
definition offense.
578
 Scholes kidnapped a fifteen-year-old near a Juneau school, bound 
her, and took her to his home.
579
 There, Scholes removed her clothes with scissors, and 
raped the girl with both his penis and a wine shaped bottle.
580
 The trial court found two 
aggravators: deliberate cruelty and conduct among the most serious within the definition 
of the offense.
581
 Affirming, the court of appeals found that both aggravators were 
established.
582
 Deliberate cruelty was established when, during the penetration of the girl 
by the narrow end of the bottle, Scholes asked the girl if it hurt.
583
 When she replied yes, 
he then inserted the wide end.
584
 As to the most serious conduct within the definition, the 
court of appeals reasoned that a single charge which could encompass multiple charges, 
like the various sexual penetrations in this case, generally permit the use of the 
aggravator.
585
 The court of appeals also found no other reason in the briefs to deviate 
                                                 
570
 Id.  
571
 Id. at 1235. 
572
 Id.  
573
 Id.  
574
 Id. at 1236. 
575
 Id. at 1235−37. 
576
 274 P.3d 496 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012). 
577
 Id. at 498. 
578
 Id.  
579
 Id. at 497. 
580
 Id.  
581
 Id. 
582
 Id. 
583
 Id. at 498. 
584
 Id. 
585
 Id. at 499. 
 41 
from that policy.
586
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that (1) intentional causation of 
extreme pain during a sexual assault was sufficient to establish the aggravator deliberate 
cruelty,
587
 and (2) the fact that conduct could have supported multiple convictions 
establishes the aggravator that the conduct is among the most serious within the 
definition offense.
588
 
 
Sitigata v. State 
In Sitigata v. State,
589
 the court of appeals held that, under the principle of joint 
accountability, an award of restitution for injuries caused by a joint assault may properly 
be imposed on a single defendant even when the charging document does not specify that 
he is being held accountable as an accomplice.
590
 Sitigata and Fuavai jointly assaulted 
Bays, breaking Bays’ teeth and jaw.591 Sitigata pleaded guilty to third-degree assault and, 
as part of his sentencing, was subsequently ordered by the superior court to pay 
restitution for the expenses attributable to the broken teeth and jaw.
592
 Sitigata argued on 
appeal that Fuavai caused the broken teeth and jaw and that Sitigata should therefore not 
be ordered to pay the entire restitution, especially because the charging document did not 
specify that Sitigata was being charged as Fuavai’s accomplice.593 The court of appeals 
rejected this argument, holding that co-defendants are both liable for injuries caused 
during their crime.
594
 The court stated that all participants are criminally accountable for 
any resulting injury or death when two or more people jointly engage in an assault, and 
further noted that it is irrelevant whether the charging document expressly charged one as 
an accomplice.
595
 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that under the 
principle of joint accountability, an award of restitution for injuries caused by a joint 
assault may properly be imposed on a single defendant even when the charging document 
does not specify that he is being held accountable as an accomplice.
596
 
 
Starkey v. State 
In Starkey v. State,
597
 the court of appeals held that the issuance of a search warrant mere 
minutes after officers entered a home may absolve any error in the officers’ initial 
entry.
598
 Officers arrived at Starkey’s house after receiving an anonymous tip about 
marijuana he was growing.
599
 After knocking on the door with no response, they smelled 
a strong marijuana plant odor and noticed unusual electrical activity indicative of a drug 
grow, and subsequently sent another officer to obtain a search warrant.
600
 When Starkey 
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arrived home, the remaining officers entered his house and began searching it under the 
reasonable belief that he had given them consent to do so.
601
 Approximately five minutes 
later, the officer returned with a valid search warrant.
602
 At trial, Starkey filed a motion to 
suppress the marijuana evidence gathered on grounds that he hadn’t actually given 
unequivocal consent for the officers to enter his home.
603
 Finding that the independent 
source doctrine applied, the court of appeals reasoned that the officer obtaining the 
warrant had no knowledge that the other officers had entered the house and therefore that 
fact did not influence the warrant application.
604
 Affirming the lower court, the court of 
appeals held that the issuance of a search warrant mere minutes after officers entered a 
home may absolve any error in the initial entry.
605
 
 
Vent v. State 
In Vent v. State,
606
 the court of appeals held that a trial judge fails to act impartially if he 
conducts research of out-of-state records without prior notice to the parties and relies on 
evidence outside of the record.
607
 A jury convicted Vent of second-degree murder and 
several charges of assault and robbery.
608
 Vent brought a claim for post-conviction relief 
for ineffective assistance of counsel.
609
 The trial court denied Vent’s motion for post-
conviction relief.
610
 On appeal, Vent argued that the judge failed to act impartially and 
actively sought impeachment information in order to deny admitting evidence.
611
 The 
court of appeals agreed, reasoning that a reasonable person would believe that the judge 
was partial to the side of the State because the judge researched out-of-state records 
without prior notice to the parties and relied on his findings from that research to impeach 
evidentiary material Vent had offered at the post-conviction relief hearing.
612
 Reversing 
the lower court, the court of appeals held that a trial judge fails to act impartially if he 
conducts research of out-of-state records without prior notice to the parties and relies on 
evidence outside of the record.
613
  
 
Wing v. State 
In Wing v. State,
614
 the court of appeals held that, by itself, an arrestee’s comment that her 
cell phone is in her pocket does not constitute an affirmative request to contact her 
attorney.
615
 After being arrested for DUI, Wing was taken to a police station.
616
 At the 
station, Wing was shown a video that informed her that she could have, in addition to the 
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breath test already taken, an independent chemical test conducted.
617
 Additionally, if she 
did not understand this right, she could contact an attorney.
618
 After answering that she 
wanted to call someone and mentioning that her cell phone was in her pocket, Wing used 
the phone provided at the police station to call a co-worker.
619
 On appeal, Wing argued 
that her right to contact an attorney was violated because she was denied access to her 
attorney’s phone number, which was in her cell phone.620 The court of appeals affirmed 
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Wing, after mentioning that she had her cell 
phone in her pocket, failed to mention her cell phone again after being granted access to 
the police station phone.
621
 The court further reasoned that Wing never informed the 
arresting officer that her attorney’s number was in her cell phone or asked to make 
another call.
622
 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that, by itself, an 
arrestee’s comment that her cell phone is in her pocket does not constitute an affirmative 
request to contact her attorney.
623
 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
top  
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
U.S. v. Golden Valley Election Association 
In U.S. v. Golden Valley Election Association, 
624
 the Ninth Circuit held that energy 
records may be relevant to a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) investigation 
and thus subject to subpoena.
625
 Golden Valley, a member-owned cooperative which 
provides electricity, was subpoenaed by the DEA to provide records pertaining to three 
customers.
626
 The DEA claimed the information was relevant to determine whether the 
three residents were involved in the manufacture and distribution of controlled 
substances.
627
 After Golden Valley did not comply, the government petitioned the district 
court to enforce the subpoena, and the petition was granted.
628
 Affirming, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the information subpoenaed need only be relevant to an agency 
investigation, not the crime. The court noted that the information requested by the DEA 
in this case satisfied relevancy requirements because the record could be used to compare 
electricity usage in the vicinity.
629
 Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that energy records 
may be relevant to a DEA investigation and thus subject to subpoena.
630
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Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Davison v. State 
In Davison v. State,
631
 the supreme court held that a sexual assault victim’s statements to 
a doctor are not admissible under Alaska’s medical treatment exception to hearsay when 
the statements are not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.
632
 R.D. 
informed her mother that she was sexually assaulted by her father, Davison.
633
 R.D. was 
brought to the hospital for an examination.
634
 In the course of the exam, the doctor 
performed a physical evaluation of R.D. and collected a verbal account of what 
occurred.
635
 Davison was later convicted of sexual assault.
636
 Davison appealed his 
conviction, arguing in part that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay by admitting 
statements made during the exam.
637
 The supreme court recognized that while hearsay is 
generally not admissible, statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment may be admissible.
638
 The supreme court reasoned that the circumstances of the 
case, including that a trooper arranged the interview and the doctor’s emphasis on the 
forensic purpose of the exam, indicated that the exam’s goal was primarily forensic and 
not medical.
639
 However, the court found the statements were harmless to the conviction. 
Affirming the conviction, the supreme court held that a sexual assault victim’s statements 
to a doctor are not admissible under Alaska’s medical treatment exception to hearsay 
when the statements are not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.
640
 
 
Phillips v. State 
In Phillips v. State,
641
 the supreme court held that a judge may be removed from a case 
based solely on the reasonable appearance of bias, and that de novo review is appropriate 
for determining such appearance.
642
 Phillips was convicted of sexual assault, and 
appealed on grounds that the trial judge should have recused himself when he realized he 
knew the victim’s sister.643 The trial judge lived in the same neighborhood as the victim’s 
sister, his wife was friends with her, and their kids played together.
644
 On appeal, the 
supreme court held that, in general, a judge may be forcibly disqualified if the 
circumstances are such that the judge would appear biased to a reasonable person.
645
 
However, the court found that this situation did not create the appearance of bias.
646
 
Affirming the lower court’s ruling, the supreme court held that a judge can be removed 
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from a case based solely on the reasonable appearance of bias, and that de novo review is 
appropriate for determining such appearance.
647
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Berezyuk v. State 
In Berezyuk v. State,
648
 the court of appeals held that a claim is deemed waived on appeal 
if the opening brief only mentions the claim without any argumentation or supporting 
citation.
649
 Berezyuk was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to sell.
650
 On 
appeal, he made several arguments concerning deficient Miranda warnings or, 
alternatively, that his rights were violated through threats of deportation and increased 
punishment if he did not cooperate. 
651
 In Berzyuk’s opening brief, twelve pages were 
devoted to his Miranda rights claims, but he never asserted that he was improperly 
coerced.
652
 The court of appeals rejected his Miranda claims and ruled that his claim of 
involuntariness was forfeited.
653
 Berezyuk had the opportunity to further argue the 
coercion claims already raised in the opening brief, but failed to do so.
654
 The court of 
appeals held that a claim is waived on appeal if the opening brief only mentions the claim 
without any argumentation or supporting citation.
655
 
 
Diggs v. State 
In Diggs v. State,
656
 the court of appeals held that a defendant is not required to take the 
stand at a competency hearing because it is part of a criminal proceeding.
657
 Diggs, who 
had a history of mental illness, was charged with two counts of assault.
658
 After reports 
were submitted that Diggs was not competent to stand trial, the State requested a hearing 
to contest the doctor’s opinion.659 The State declared its intention to call Diggs as a 
witness.
660
 The superior court granted the motion, concluding that Diggs’ rights against 
self-incrimination would not be violated so long as his statements were not admissible at 
trial and were used solely for determining his competency.
661
 On appeal, the court of 
appeals held that, since legal proceedings had begun, a competency hearing was part of a 
“criminal case” under the United States Constitution and part of a “criminal proceeding” 
under the Alaska Constitution.
662
 Therefore, the court found that the right against self-
incrimination applied to Diggs in this case and, as a defendant in a criminal proceeding, 
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he could not be called against his will to take the stand.
663
 Reversing the superior court, 
the court of appeals held that a defendant is not required to take the stand at a 
competency hearing because it is part of a criminal proceeding.
664
 
 
Jones v. State 
In Jones v. State,
665
 the court of appeals held that if a defendant intends to testify at a 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing and such hearing hinges on the defendant’s 
credibility as a witness, then the defendant must be transported to the hearing.
666
 Jones 
accepted a plea bargain for second-degree murder.
667
 Subsequently, Jones filed a petition 
for post-conviction relief, challenging the representation his lawyer had previously 
provided.
668
 To attend the hearing, Jones filed a motion asking to be transported to 
Anchorage.
669
 The lower court denied the motion because the judge thought his 
credibility as a witness could be fairly assessed whether the testimony was given in 
person or over the phone; Jones later testified at the hearing by telephone.
670
 On appeal, 
Jones challenged the lower court’s decision to not allow him to provide testimony in 
person.
671
 Vacating the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals concluded that Jones 
should have been allowed to attend this hearing.
672
 The court reasoned that, under Alaska 
law, if a convicted defendant’s testimony will be “material” and based on facts within the 
defendant’s personal knowledge, then the defendant’s presence at such hearings is 
necessary.
673
 Vacating the lower court, the court of appeals held that if a defendant 
intends to testify at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing and such hearing hinges on the 
defendant’s credibility as a witness, then the defendant must be transported to the 
hearing.
674
 
 
Leopold v State 
In Leopold v State,
675
 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s composite sentence of 
109 years’ imprisonment is not inherently excessive.676 Leopold invited his sister to a 
party at his house and raped her after she fell asleep.
677
 He was convicted of first-degree 
sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, and incest.
678
 Based on the court’s finding 
that Leopold was a worst offender, it sentenced him to a composite sentence of 109 
years’ imprisonment.679 On appeal, Leopold challenged the court's finding that he was a 
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worst offender and the length of his sentence.
680
 The court of appeals upheld the worst 
offender finding due to Leopold’s multiple prior convictions, the unlikelihood of his 
rehabilitation, and the extreme danger he posed to the public.
681
 The court of appeals also 
upheld Leopold’s composite sentence because it was reasonable for the judge to find such 
a sentence necessary to protect the public.
682
 Affirming the lower court, the court of 
appeals held that a defendant’s composite sentence of 109 years’ imprisonment is not 
inherently excessive.
683
 
 
McKinley v. State 
In McKinley v. State,
684
 the court of appeals declined to extend the scope of the statute 
which gives defendants credit for time spent in custody to include credit for the entire 
time spent in a residential treatment program.
685
 McKinley was charged with theft.
686
 
While he was awaiting trial, he entered a residential treatment facility for five months.
687
 
Later, he pled guilty and received a sentence of sixty months, but asked the superior court 
to give him five months of credit for the time he spent in the residential treatment 
program.
688
 The court gave him credit for only thirty days because only the first thirty 
days of the program satisfied AS 12.55.027(c)(2)’s strict requirement that the conditions 
must approximate those experienced by someone who is incarcerated.
689
 On appeal, 
McKinley argued that the court should follow a more liberal standard for granting 
credit.
690
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that the statute clearly only allows credit 
for time spent in conditions similar to incarceration.
691
 The court of appeals reasoned that 
the wording of the statute was clear, although possibly contradictory to the legislature’s 
policy goals and the goals of the prison system.
692
 Affirming, the court of appeals 
declined to extend the scope of the statute which gives defendants credit for time spent in 
custody to include credit for the entire time spent in a residential treatment program.
693
 
 
Selig v. State 
In Selig v. State,
694
 the court of appeals held that the police are not required to record the 
non-interrogative aspects of DUI processing.
695
 After causing a collision, Selig was 
arrested for driving under the influence.
696
 A breath test and an independent blood test 
                                                 
680
 Id. at 294. 
681
 Id. at 295. 
682
 Id. at 296. 
683
 Id. at 286. 
684
 275 P.3d 567 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012). 
685
 Id. at 567–68. 
686
 Id. at 568 
687
 Id. 
688
 Id.  
689
 Id.  
690
 Id. at 567. 
691
 Id. at 573. 
692
 Id. 
693
 Id. at 567–68. 
694
 286 P.3d 767 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012). 
695
 Id. at 771. 
696
 Id. at 767. 
 48 
revealed a blood alcohol level more than double the legal limit in Alaska.
697
 Selig argued 
in district court that the results of the tests should be suppressed because the officers did 
not make an audio recording of the DUI processing.
698
 The district court denied the 
motion, reasoning that the Stephan rule that requires an audio recording of every 
custodial interrogation did not apply because the trooper did not interrogate Selig during 
the DUI processing.
699
 On appeal, Selig renewed his argument that the evidence from his 
DUI processing should be suppressed because the processing was not recorded.
700
 The 
court of appeals also disagreed, reasoning that the purpose of the Stephan rule was 
narrowly tailored to assure that confessions were voluntarily made.
701
 Further, the court 
reasoned that police time logs could independently verify that the requirement for a 
fifteen minute observation period before a breath test was followed.
702
 Affirming, the 
court of appeals held that the police are not required to record the non-interrogative 
aspects of DUI processing.
703
 
 
Stansberry v. State 
In Stansberry v. State,
704
 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s opportunity to 
understand and regain the right to attend their proceedings can be satisfactorily explained 
to them even if they are not physically present in the courtroom.
705
 The trial court judge 
removed Stansberry from the courtroom after he failed to demonstrate his ability to 
control himself within the courtroom.
706
 Stansberry was placed in a holding cell equipped 
with audio and visual equipment that enabled him to watch his trial, and his attorney was 
able to communicate with him at will.
707
 After being convicted, Stansberry argued that he 
was not properly informed of his right to reenter the courtroom.
708
 Affirming Stansbery’s 
conviction, the court of appeals held that even though Stansberry was not physically 
present in the courtroom when the judge informed him he would be allowed to return if 
he reformed his behavior, the audio and visual equipment was sufficient to ensure that 
Stansberry was aware of his right to return.
709
 The court reasoned that the record clearly 
showed Stansberry was able to hear the proceedings.
710
 Affirming, the court of appeals 
held that a defendant’s opportunity to understand and regain the right to attend their 
proceedings can be satisfactorily explained to them even if they are not physically present 
in the courtroom.
711
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Wilkerson v. State 
In Wilkerson v. State,
712
 the court of appeals held that a witness' opinion concerning a 
defendant's character is inadmissible when the witness lacks personal knowledge of the 
defendant.
713
 The trial court found Wilkerson guilty of first-degree murder, evidence 
tampering, and third-degree weapons misconduct in the death of his brother.
714
 On 
appeal, Wilkerson argued that it was improper to permit the State to present character 
evidence consisting of the testimony of a police detective when that testimony was based 
on hearsay.
715
 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that personal knowledge is 
necessary when a witness provides character opinions.
716
 The police detective lacked this 
personal knowledge since his opinion of Wilkerson was created by review of case files 
and not personal acquaintance with Wilkerson.
717
 Accordingly, the trial court wrongfully 
allowed the police detective to give his opinion of Wilkerson, but the court found the 
error was harmless because eyewitness agreement rendered the opinion’s admission 
moot.
718
 Affirming, the court of appeals held that a witness' opinion concerning a 
defendant's character is inadmissible when the witness lacks personal knowledge of the 
defendant.
719
 
 
ELECTION LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
In re 2011 Redistricting Cases 
In In re 2011 Redistricting Cases,
720
 the supreme court held that the Alaska Redistricting 
Board (“Board”) must design a reapportionment plan based on the requirements of the 
Alaska Constitution and then that plan must be tested against the Voting Rights Act 
(“VRA”).721 The superior court found that although the Board’s initial drawing of the 
redistricting corresponded with the VRA, four districts did not comply with the Alaska 
Constitution.
722
 The supreme court upheld the superior court’s ruling.723 Upon remand, 
the Board made changes but only to the four districts.
724
 The superior court rejected the 
amended plan.
725
 The supreme court upheld the superior court’s rejection of the Board’s 
amended plan, reasoning that the Board created the twenty-two districts to comply with 
the VRA as the first priority instead of first meeting the Alaska Constitution's 
requirements of compactness, contiguity, and socio-economic integration as the primary 
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consideration.
726
 The supreme court held that the Board must design a reapportionment 
plan based on the requirements of the Alaska Constitution and then that plan must be 
tested against the VRA.
727
 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Boyko v. Anchorage School District 
In Boyko v. Anchorage School District,
728
 the supreme court held that an employer’s 
refusal to provide a recommendation for an employee does not violate a resignation 
agreement in which the employer promised not to make negative statements about the 
employee.
729
 Boyko resigned from her teaching position in lieu of termination after 
violating an agreement which conditioned her continuing employment on several 
provisions relating to alcoholism treatment.
730
 Boyko recorded a conversation with the 
Anchorage School District’s human resources director in which the director stated that, 
upon her resignation, no information would be released and no negative information 
would be on her record.
731
 Following her resignation, the School District declined to 
provide recommendations for her when contacted by Boyko’s prospective employers.732 
Boyko sued the School District for breach of the resignation agreement.
733
 The superior 
court granted summary judgment for the School District and dismissed all of Boyko’s 
claims.
734
 The supreme court remanded the issue of whether the resignation agreement 
was a contract, but held that the School District’s refusal to provide a recommendation 
for Boyko did not violate the resignation agreement.
735
 Affirming, the supreme court held 
that an employer’s refusal to provide a recommendation for an employee does not violate 
a resignation agreement in which the employer promised not to make negative statements 
about the employee 
 
Grundberg v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights 
In Grundberg v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights,
736
 the supreme court held 
that the non-discriminatory reasons an employer provides for not promoting a person are 
immaterial when evaluating whether that person provided substantial evidence that could 
support an inference of discriminatory employer intent.
737
 Grundberg, a 58 year-old 
Asian-American female, held an Engineer I position.
738
 While employed in this position, 
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recruitment for an Engineer II position took place.
739
 After being denied the position for 
facially legitimate reasons given by her interviewers, Grundberg filed a complaint.
740
 The 
commission charged with investigating the complaint ultimately concluded that the 
complaint was not supported by substantial evidence despite a letter Grundberg filed 
alleging multiple accounts of adverse employment actions she had been subjected to over 
the course of her employment.
741
 The superior court affirmed this conclusion.
742
 On 
appeal, Grundberg argued that she produced enough evidence to rebut her employer’s 
facially legitimate reasons for hiring someone else for the Engineer II position.
743
 The 
supreme court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
744
 It reasoned that since 
direct evidence is difficult to produce because it is often in the hands of the employer, the 
evidence produced by Grundberg was substantial enough to support an inference of 
discriminatory intent regardless of the reasons given by the employer.
745
 Reversing the 
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the non-discriminatory reasons an 
employer provides for not promoting a person are immaterial when evaluating whether 
that person provided substantial evidence that could support an inference of 
discriminatory employer intent.
746
 
 
Lentine v. State 
In Lentine v. State,
747
 the supreme court held that an employer may be found to breach an 
implied covenant of good faith when terminating an employee by having a biased 
supervisor involved in the decision only if the plaintiff proves that the biased supervisor 
either (1) played a significant role in the decision, or (2) was motivated by bad faith.
748
 
Lentine was terminated from her position with the State for falsifying information on a 
timesheet.
749
 Subsequently, she filed a complaint against the State, alleging her 
termination violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because a 
supervisor involved acted in bad faith during the termination.
750
 The superior court ruled 
in favor of the State.
751
 On appeal, Lentine argued that the superior court erred because 
her supervisor acted in bad faith during the termination process.
752
 Affirming, the 
supreme court found there was not a breach of the implied covenant because the 
supervisor did not play an active role in the dismissal, and there was not adequate 
evidence that the supervisor acted in bad faith.
753
 Affirming the superior court, the 
supreme court held that an employer may be found to breach an implied covenant of 
good faith when terminating an employee by having a biased supervisor involved in the 
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decision only if the plaintiff proves that the biased supervisor either (1) played a 
significant role in the decision, or (2) was motivated by bad faith.
754
 
 
Oels v. Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n. 
In Oels v. Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n.,755 the supreme court held 
that Anchorage Municipal Code § 03.30.068(A)(4), which establishes a retire/rehire 
program for city employees, requires that city employees be rehired into the same 
position or into a position in the same or similar class.
756
 Oels was a sergeant in the 
Alaska Police Department (“APD”) who sought to retire from his position and then be 
rehired as a sergeant under a program established by § 03.30.068(A)(4).
757
 Section 
03.30.068(A)(4) provides that an employee may retire and be rehired “at the entry level 
salary, leave accrual, and seniority.”758 Oels was told that, if approved, he would be 
rehired as a patrol officer, an entry level position below the rank of sergeant.
759
 The 
superior court found the “entry level” language of § 03.30.068(A)(4) ambiguous and held 
that it allowed the APD to rehire officers under the program at an entry level position.
760
 
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the lower court’s judgment, declaring that § 
03.30.068(A)(4) unambiguously permitted the APD to rehire officers only at an entry 
level “salary, leave accrual, and seniority,” but not at an entry level position.761 The 
supreme court reasoned that the purpose of the retire/rehire program was to allow city 
employees to retire and receive the benefits of their city retirement program, but still 
return to work for the city under a new retirement program.
762
 Reversing, the supreme 
court held that § 03.30.068(A)(4) requires that city employees be rehired into the same 
position or into a position in the same or similar class.
763
 
 
Peterson v. State 
In Peterson v. State,
764
 the supreme court held that based on Alaska’s Public Employment 
Relations Act (“PERA”), a union-relations privilege is recognized for communications 
(1) between an employee or employee’s attorney and union representatives, (2) made in 
confidence, (3) in connection with representative services relevant to anticipated or 
ongoing grievance or disciplinary proceedings, and (4) by representatives acting in 
official representative capacity.
765
 Peterson was a member of Alaska State Employees 
Association (“ASEA”) and requested time credit for a previous period of employment 
with the State.
766
 During an investigation of his request, the State determined that 
Peterson’s job application failed to disclose a prior felony and the State terminated his 
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employment.
767
 Peterson first filed a grievance and after unsuccessfully resolving the 
grievance, he filed suit in superior court for wrongful termination.
768
 The State 
subpoenaed the ASEA representative who had handled Peterson’s grievance and the 
superior court denied Peterson’s motion for a protective order preventing the ASEA 
representative from testifying.
769
 Reversing, the supreme court reasoned that while the 
attorney-client privilege did not extend to union representations, the court could 
recognize a new privilege if it was found in state statutes, court rules, or the state or 
federal constitutions.
770
 The supreme court found the privilege implied in Alaska’s 
statutes, noting that the right granted by PERA for unions to operate free of harassment 
and undue interference from the State includes the right to confidential communications 
with union representatives.
771
 Reversing the superior court’s discovery ruling, the 
supreme court held that a union-relations privilege is recognized for communications (1) 
between an employee or employee’s attorney and union representative, (2) made in 
confidence, (3) in connection with representative services relevant to anticipated or 
ongoing grievance or disciplinary proceedings, and (4) by representatives acting in 
official representative capacity.
772
 
 
Trudell v. Hibbert 
In Trudell v. Hibbert,
773
 the supreme court held that project owners who are potentially 
liable for securing workmen’s compensation include business owners who hire 
contractors to perform work that benefits their business.
774
 The Hibberts hired a 
contractor to repair their residence, part of which functioned as the office for their cab 
business.
775
 Trudell was the contractor’s employee and was seriously injured after falling 
from a ladder while performing his work.
776
 The contractor did not have workers’ 
compensation insurance.
777
 Trudell sued his employer, who subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy, as well as the Hibberts as project owners.
778
 After a bench trial, the superior 
court found in favor of the Hibberts, declaring that project owners as defined by AS 
23.30.045 are limited to business owners that contract out their usual work to others.
779
 
On appeal, the supreme court held that the statutory definition of “project owner” does 
not limit liability to instances when a business contracts out its usual work to others, 
reasoning that the statutory text and the legislative history display the broad purpose of 
ensuring workers compensation by requiring businesses to make sure their contractors 
have insurance or to get it themselves.
780
 The proper test for determining project owner 
liability is the extent to which the business benefitted from the work performed and the 
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connection between the work and the business.
781
  Reversing the supreme court held that 
project owners who are potentially liable for securing workmen’s compensation include 
business owners who hire contractors to perform work that benefits their business.
782
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ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
L.D.G., Inc. v. Robinson 
In L.D.G., Inc. v. Robinson,
783
 the supreme court held that the existence of an unsettled 
area of law does not excuse an attorney from a duty of care.
784
 Freeman was served 
alcohol while visibly intoxicated by L.D.G., an authorized server of alcohol.
785
 Freeman 
subsequently murdered a woman.
786
 In the following wrongful death action, Robinson, 
L.D.G.’s attorney, did not assert a defense of third party liability, and the court found 
against L.D.G. for a substantial sum.
787
 L.D.G. then sued Robinson for failing to assert a 
defense of third party liability.
788
 The supreme court first examined the relied upon case 
law and found that, despite Robinson’s argument to the contrary, the law was unsettled 
regarding dram shop liability and liability of consuming patrons.
789
 The supreme court 
then examined the duty of care of attorneys when the law is unsettled.
790
 It concluded that 
the attorney must at least recognize the uncertainty and advise the client as to how to 
proceed in light of the uncertainty.
791
 Therefore, Robinson had breached his duty of 
care.
792
 Reversing and remanding, the supreme court held that the existence of an 
unsettled area of law does not excuse an attorney from a duty of care.
793
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FAMILY LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Adoption of Xavier K. 
In Adoption of Xavier K.,
794
 the supreme court held that a biological parent who already 
has a legal parent-child relationship with his or her own child is not qualified under 
Alaska adoption statutes to adopt that child.
795
 Katz and Smith had a child, Xavier, but 
never were married.
796
 Following a disagreement, Katz petitioned to adopt Xavier, 
arguing that Smith’s consent was not needed since he had abandoned Xavier for at least 
six months, had no meaningful communication with Xavier, and did not provide child 
support payments.
797
 The superior court concluded that Smith did not need to consent to 
the adoption, but decided that it was not in Xavier’s best interests to grant the adoption to 
Katz and therefore denied the petition.
798
 On appeal, the supreme court found that 
adoption would terminate a father’s parental rights without his consent and without a 
legally obligated adult as a replacement, which contravened the purposes of adoption.
799
 
Alaska’s adoption statutes allow for an individual to adopt another individual to create a 
parent-child relationship.
800
 The court reasoned that since Katz already had a legal 
parent-child relationship with her son, Katz could not use the adoption process to 
terminate the parental rights of Smith.
801
 Affirming the decision of the superior court 
denying Katz’s petition, the supreme court held that a biological parent who already has a 
legal parent-child relationship with his or her own child is not qualified under the 
adoption statutes to adopt the child.
802
 
 
Berry v. Berry 
In Berry v. Berry,
803
 the supreme court held that in order for attorney fees to be awarded 
in a divorce proceeding where the economic status of both parties is essentially equal, 
one party must act in bad faith.
804
 April Berry filed a complaint for divorce from her 
husband, Michael Berry.
805
 April was represented by an attorney, and Michael 
represented himself.
806
 At the end of trial, the superior court ordered Michael to pay April 
for her part of her attorney's fees based on both parties' misconduct.
807
  Reversing in part, 
the supreme court found that the superior court abused its discretion in awarding fees 
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because the record did not show Michael acted in bad faith.
808
 The supreme court 
reasoned that there is a two-step rule for awarding attorney fees in a divorce proceeding: 
first, the court must determine how much of the fees each party would have had to bear in 
order “to level the playing field;” second, the court may adjust the award to account for a 
party’s bad faith or misconduct.809 Reversing in part, the supreme court held that in order 
for attorney fees to be awarded in a divorce proceeding where the economic status of 
both parties is essentially equal, one party must act in bad faith.
810
 
 
Coleman v. McCullough 
In Coleman v. McCullough,
811
 the supreme court held that a father is not entitled to a 
child support deduction for obligations to his first child even if he had commenced a 
relationship with the mother of his second child prior to the first child’s birth.812 Coleman 
had two minor sons with two different mothers.
813
 Coleman had started a relationship 
with the second mother prior to the birth of the first son.
 814
 When the first mother 
petitioned for child support, Coleman argued that he should be allowed a deduction 
because his relationship with the second mother began before his first son was born.
815
 
The superior court ruled that Coleman was not entitled to a deduction.
816
 The supreme 
court rejected Coleman’s contention that his income should be adjusted due to his current 
support of and residency with the second son.
817
 The supreme court reasoned that a 
parent’s duty of support begins the day of a child’s birth.818 Coleman therefore had a duty 
of support to his first son on the day of his birth, and the fact that Coleman’s relationship 
with the second mother began prior to the birth of his first son was immaterial to 
determining support obligations.
819
 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held a 
father is not entitled to a child support deduction for obligations to his first child even if 
he had commenced a relationship with the mother of his second child prior to the first 
child’s birth.820 
 
Cox v. Floreske 
In Cox v. Floreske,
821
 the supreme court held that awarding a lifetime right of first refusal 
after marital property division is inequitable and an abuse of discretion.
822
 During the 
marriage between Cox and Floreske, the couple accumulated a marital estate largely 
consisting of three businesses and two subdivisions.
823
 According to their divorce 
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proceedings, Floreske was awarded two of the businesses and a few real-estate 
properties; Cox was awarded the other business and the majority of the properties in the 
subdivisions.
824
 The court granted both parties a right of first refusal in the properties: if 
one party tried to sell an awarded property, the other party had an opportunity to match 
any offer tendered on the property.
825
 On appeal, Cox argued that this right of first refusal 
should be vacated because of its indefiniteness.
826
 Agreeing with Cox, the supreme court 
reversed the lower court’s decision to uphold the right of first refusal judgment.827 The 
supreme court reasoned that the lifetime right of first refusal was not equitable.
828
 
Further, allowing Floreske to have this power over the property awarded to Cox could 
create friction and was fundamentally against the goal of disentangling the parties.
829
 
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that awarding a lifetime 
right of first refusal after marital property division is inequitable and an abuse of 
discretion.
830
 
 
Day v. Williams 
In Day v. Williams,
831
 the supreme court held that if there is no evidence that funds were 
wasted between the date of separation and the trial, then valuing funds at the date of 
separation to determine final property distribution upon divorce is improper.
832
 Day and 
Williams separated in 2007.
833
 After their separation but before the trial to determine the 
final property distribution, Day used $33,548 for her living expenses, which she 
withdrew from a joint checking account.
834
 The superior court distributed this amount to 
Day in its property distribution.
835
 On appeal, Day argued that this money should not 
have been included in the final property division or alternatively that it should have been 
valued closer to the time of trial.
836
 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held 
that property value should be calculated near the trial date, not near the date of 
separation.
837
 The court reasoned that, so long as funds are used for normal living 
expenses, recapture of those funds cannot be justified.
838
 Reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that if there is no evidence that funds were wasted 
between the date of separation and the trial, then valuing funds at the date of separation to 
determine final property distribution upon divorce is improper.
839
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Gorton v. Mann 
In Gorton v. Mann,
840
 the supreme court held that, for the purposes of calculating child 
support payments, a parent is only permitted to deduct from his adjusted annual income 
the amount of money actually paid for the support of children from a prior relationship.
841
 
Gorton and Mann were the parents of a minor child.
842
 Gorton was also a parent of two 
children from a prior marriage.
843
 After Gorton and Mann divorced, Gorton sought to 
reduce the amount of child support he was required to provide Mann by deducting from 
his adjusted annual income not only the amount he actually paid to his other ex-wife for 
the support of their two children, but also an additional percentage for what he claimed to 
pay in support of those children while they were living with him.
844
 The superior court 
ruled against Gorton’s claim.845 The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that, in shared 
custody arrangements, additional deductions for the amount of money that a parent 
spends on the children while they are in his custody are prohibited because this amount 
has already been taken into account by the formula used for determining payments.
846
 
Affirming, the supreme court held that, for the purposes of calculating child support 
payments, a parent is only permitted to deduct from his adjusted annual income the 
amount of money actually paid for the support of children from a prior relationship.
847
 
 
Hannah B. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services  
In Hannah B. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,
848
 the supreme court 
held that the superior court may consider a child in need of aid’s placement with a 
relative as a factor weighing against the termination of parental rights in certain 
circumstances, but such a consideration does not necessarily outweigh other factors like 
permanency in determining the best interests of the child.
849
 Hannah B., a mother with a 
long and troubled history of drug abuse, sought to prevent termination of parental rights 
to her son, Jacob.
850
 Jacob had been placed with his maternal grandmother beginning at 
16 months of age and continuing, mostly without significant contact with his mother, 
until he was three-and-a-half years old, when the Office of Children’s Services initiated 
termination proceedings.
851
 The superior court granted termination, finding that Hannah 
B. had failed to make timely and substantial progress in her treatment programs and that 
Jacob required a permanent, stable arrangement immediately.
852
 On review, the supreme 
court upheld the superior court’s ruling, reasoning that a child’s need for permanence and 
stability may rightly govern the court’s best-interests analysis.853 The supreme court 
rejected the claim that since a child would remain with a maternal grandparent whether or 
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not parental rights were terminated, it is clear error for the superior court to terminate 
rights in this circumstance.
854
 The supreme court held that the superior court may 
consider a child in need of aid’s placement with a relative as a factor weighing against the 
termination of parental rights in certain circumstances, but such a consideration does not 
necessarily outweigh other factors like permanency in determining the best interests of 
the child.
855
 
 
Helen S.K. v. Samuel M.K. 
In Helen S.K. v. Samuel M.K,
856
 the supreme court held that a parent’s due process rights 
are not violated by a court conducting in camera interviews with their three children 
during custody proceedings, so long as the parties are provided summary transcripts.
857
 
Helen S.K. and Samuel M.K. divorced, and subsequently went to a custody hearing for 
their three children.
858
 At the conclusion of a hearing on interim custody, the superior 
court agreed with Samuel’s request to interview the children despite Helen’s objection 
that putting this responsibility on the children would be unhealthy and that they had 
already been overly involved in the process.
859
 On appeal, Helen argued that the superior 
court violated her right to due process by conducting in camera interviews with the 
children because the transcripts of the interviews were not disclosed, and she did not 
know the evidence that would be used against her at trial.
860
 Affirming, the supreme court 
reasoned that while in camera interviews should be used only rarely because of the 
possibility that they might constitute infringement of a parent’s due process rights, 
sometimes in camera interviews may be in the best interests of the children.
861
 The court 
then explained that as long as the parties are provided summaries of the interview 
transcripts, the parents’ due process rights are not violated.862 Affirming, the supreme 
court held that a parent’s due process rights are not violated by a court conducting in 
camera interviews with their three children during custody proceedings, so long as the 
parties are provided summary transcripts.
863
 
 
Hunter v. Conwell 
In Hunter v. Conwell,
864
 the supreme court held that repeated but inconsistent problems 
with telephonic visitation by a non-custodial parent does not, by itself, constitute a 
substantial change of circumstances justifying a modification of parental rights.
865
 
Conwell was awarded sole legal custody of the two sons he had with Hunter.
866
 Two 
years later, Hunter sought modification of the custody arrangement, alleging that a 
substantial change in the children’s circumstances had occurred because, among other 
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things, Conwell was interfering with court-ordered telephonic visitation.
867
 The superior 
court found that Hunter had not demonstrated a substantial change in the circumstances 
warranting modification of custody, but noted that the problems in telephonic visitation 
would amount to a substantial change if not remedied.
868
 On appeal, the supreme court 
affirmed the superior court’s decision, and reiterated the admonition of the importance of 
telephonic visitation when geographic separation makes frequent in-person parental 
visitation impossible.
869
 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that repeated 
but inconsistent problems with telephonic visitation by a non-custodial parent does not, 
by itself, constitute a substantial change of circumstances justifying a modification of 
parental rights.
870
 
 
In the Matter of the Protective Proceedings of M.K 
In In the Matter of the Protective Proceedings of M.K,
871
 the supreme court held that 
Alaska’s guardianship statutes do not require that a public guardian be appointed only 
when no other qualified person is available.
872
 M.K., a thirty-four-year old woman, 
suffered from many psychological disorders.
873
 The superior court held that M.K. 
required a guardian because she was incapacitated as defined in Alaska’s guardianship 
statutes and that the Office of Public Advocacy (“OPA”) should be appointed as guardian 
in her best interests.
874
 M.K. appealed, arguing that her mother should have been 
appointed as her guardian because the OPA should be appointed only if no other person 
was willing and able to perform the functions of a guardian.
875
 The supreme court 
reasoned that, while Alaska’s guardianship statutes set an order in which qualified 
persons have priority for appointment as a guardian, the order may be altered if it is in the 
best interests of the incapacitated person.
876
 The court explained that the Alaska’s 
statutes’ plain meaning does not express that public guardians may be appointed only in 
the case where there is no person willing and qualified to serve as a guardian.
877
 The 
supreme court further stated that the legislative history supported appointing a public 
guardian if it was in the person’s best interests.878 Affirming the superior court, the 
supreme court held that Alaska’s guardianship statutes do not require that a public 
guardian be appointed only when no other qualified person is available.
879
 
 
Josh L. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services delete? 
In Josh L. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,
880
 the supreme court held 
that the Office of Children’s Services’ (“OCS”) active-effort obligation under the Indian 
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Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) to place a child in need of aid with a member of the same 
family or tribe is determined on a case-by-case basis and is limited by the practical 
circumstances of the case, including the parent’s inaction or incarceration and the 
suitability of options within the family or tribe.
881
 Josh was indicted on charges of sexual 
assault and agreed that his special-needs daughter Eva be temporarily placed in a 
therapeutic foster home, deviating from the placement preference requirement of the 
ICWA.
882
 After OCS failed to identify a family member or tribe suitable for Eva, Josh 
appealed the superior court’s decision that OCS had fulfilled its active-effort obligation 
by failing to seek placement with Josh’s extended family.883 Affirming the lower court, 
the supreme court held that OCS’s efforts constituted active effort to prevent the break-up 
of an Indian family, reasoning that each determination must be case-specific. The court 
noted that OCS attempted to gain the consent of Josh’s mother to take Eva, determined 
that several of his sisters had known sex offenders in their household, and attempted to 
identify a Native village with the requisite resources to care for Eva.
884
 Affirming, the 
supreme court held that the OCS’s active-effort obligation under the ICWA to place a 
child in need of aid with a member of the same family or tribe is determined on a case-
by-case basis and is limited by the practical circumstances of the case, including the 
parent’s inaction or incarceration and the suitability of options within the family or 
tribe.
885
 
 
Lewis v. Lewis  
In Lewis v. Lewis,
886
 the supreme court held that a divorce settlement agreement which 
splits assets in an amount exceeding 100% is not enforceable as there is no meeting of the 
minds.
887
 Following Chad and Jessica Lewis’s divorce, they participated in a settlement 
conference in superior court.
888
 Although the court initially recited a proposed settlement 
that was agreed to by both parties, it subsequently accepted proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law drafted by Jessica, which were materially different from the terms 
initially cited.
889
 On appeal, Chad argued that the superior court’s findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous and that the initial settlement should control.
890
 The supreme court 
agreed in part with Chad’s argument.891 The court reasoned that the only evidence of the 
parties’ intent was in the initially recited agreement, and there was no evidence for the 
superior court to find that they had any different intent.
892
 However, the court reasoned 
that the recited agreement could not control either because its terms created an impossible 
outcome.
893
 Vacating and remanding, the supreme court held that a divorce settlement 
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agreement which splits assets in an amount exceeding 100% is not enforceable as there is 
no meeting of the minds.
894
 
 
Mallory D v. Malcolm D 
In Mallory D v. Malcolm D,
895
 the supreme court held that the presumption precluding a 
parent with a history of domestic violence from obtaining legal or physical custody of the 
children does not apply when both parties have committed acts of domestic violence 
during the marriage.
896
 When Mallory and Malcolm filed for dissolution of their 
marriage, the two agreed that, in addition to joint legal custody, they would share 
physical custody of their three children.
897
 However, at a subsequent, Mallory moved to 
change this custody agreement.
898
 During the proceedings, both Mallory and Malcolm 
testified regarding domestic violence by the other on two separate occasions during the 
marriage.
899
 As a result, the lower court denied Mallory’s motion to modify the custody 
agreement.
900
 The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that if the lower court found that 
both parents had a history of domestic violence and neither was more likely to continue 
this violence, the lower court had discretion to not apply the presumption to either 
parent.
901
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the 
presumption that precludes a parent with a history of domestic violence from obtaining 
legal or physical custody of the children does not apply when both parties had committed 
acts of domestic violence during the marriage.
902
 
 
Martha S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Martha S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
903
 the supreme court held 
that a therapist’s testimony regarding statements made during a therapy session may be 
admissible under a medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule.
904
 The Office of 
Children’s Services took custody of Martha’s two youngest children.905 At a later 
adjudication, the superior court found that the children were in need of aid and were to 
remain outside the home for a period not to exceed 18 months.
906
 On appeal, Martha 
challenged several of the superior court’s evidentiary rulings, including the use of a 
therapist’s testimony.907 The supreme court found that the superior court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing into evidence the testimony of a therapist regarding statements one 
of the children made to her during a therapy session.
908
 Because the purpose of the 
therapy session was treatment and diagnosis, the court reasoned that the statements were 
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admissible under a medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule.
909
 Affirming the 
lower court, the supreme court held that a therapist’s testimony regarding statements 
made during a therapy session may be admissible under a medical treatment exception to 
the hearsay rule.
910
 
 
McLaren v. McLaren 
In McLaren v. McLaren,
911
 the supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding, property 
acquired before marriage but during cohabitation may be included in the valuation of the 
marital estate.
912
 Teresa and Darren McLaren first began living together in 1988, but they 
did not become legally married until 1999.
913
 The superior court characterized the civil 
service retirement benefits that Teresa accrued during the ten years she lived with Darren 
before marriage as marital property.
914
 Teresa appealed, arguing that courts can only 
divide property acquired during the actual marriage.
915
 Affirming the lower court, the 
supreme court explained that as long as the parties ultimately do become married, courts 
may consider the entirety of the parties’ relationships, including premarital cohabitation, 
in the division of property.
916
 Reasoning that the couple acted as a single economic unit 
while they lived together before marriage, the supreme court allowed the superior court 
discretion in including premarital property in the marital estate.
917
 Affirming the lower 
court, the supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding, property acquired before 
marriage but during cohabitation may be included in the valuation of the marital estate.
918
 
 
Patrawke v. Liebes 
In Patrawke v. Liebes,
919
 the supreme court held that in the absence of a contrary reason, 
a parent with joint custody can be ordered to legally consent to their child obtaining a 
passport when the other parent presents compelling and timely arguments in favor of 
obtaining one.
920
 Patrawke and Liebes were never married and never lived together, but 
shared joint legal and equal physical custody of Kyndle.
921
 Patrawke sought consent from 
Liebes to execute a passport on Kyndle’s behalf so Kyndle would be able to visit 
relatives out of state and participate in her elementary school’s travel opportunities.922 
Liebes did not consent and Patrawke sought a court order requiring Liebes to legally do 
so.
923
 The superior court denied Patrawke’s motion, finding that the school’s travel 
opportunities were too distant to necessitate a decision.
924
 On appeal, the supreme court 
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reasoned that the courts were required to account for the child’s best interest in the 
situation, and that Liebes failed to offer any reason why it would not be in Kyndle’s best 
interest to obtain a passport.
925
 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that 
in the absence of a contrary reason, a parent with joint custody can be ordered to legally 
consent to their child obtaining a passport when the other parent presents compelling and 
timely arguments in favor of obtaining one.
926
 
 
Paula E. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Paula E. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,
927
 the supreme court held 
that while the State should notify a grandmother of permanency and placement hearings 
for her grandchildren, her due process rights are not violated by non-notification if she 
has the opportunity to participate in subsequent hearings.
928
 Paula took care of her four 
grandchildren for approximately a year until she left to take care of her ill mother.
929
 
When Paula returned, the Office of Children’s Services informed her that because of 
negative reports about her treatment of the children, they would be placed with another 
family.
930
 Paula was not given notice of several hearings that took place regarding her 
grandchildren’s status and placement.931 Paula asserted several claims of a violation of 
her due process rights based on lack of notice, but the superior court disagreed.
932
 
Affirming, the supreme court found that any prejudice from lack of notice was fixed by 
her later opportunity to be heard and have her interests represented.
933
 The court weighed 
three factors: (1) the private interest affected by official action, (2) the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and (3) the 
Government’s interest.934 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held 
that while the State should notify a grandmother of permanency and placement hearings 
for her grandchildren, her due process rights are not violated by non-notification if she 
has the opportunity to participate in subsequent hearings.
935
 
 
Stephanie F. v. George C. 
In Stephanie F. v. George C.,
936
 the supreme court held that the statutory presumption 
against awarding child custody to a parent responsible for acts of domestic violence may 
be overcome by means other than the completion of the Batterers’ Intervention 
Program.
937
 George and Stephanie sought physical and legal custody of their children 
during divorce proceedings.
938
 The record showed that on two occasions George had 
committed acts of domestic violence.
939
 George sought private counseling following the 
incidents but did not complete the Batterer’s Intervention Program.940 The superior court 
held that, due to AS 25.24.150(h), completion of the Batterers’ Intervention Program was 
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the only way to overcome the statutory presumption.
941
 Nevertheless, the superior court 
awarded George custody based on concern for the children’s wellbeing.942 The supreme 
court held that completion of the Batterer’s Intervention program was not the only way to 
overcome AS 25.24.150(g)’s presumption.943 The court reasoned that the plain meaning 
and legislative history of the statutes supported the conclusion that the legislature used 
the word “may” and included the phrase “where reasonably available” because it did not 
intend that there should be only one way to overcome the statutory presumption.
944
 
Remanding, the supreme court held that the statutory presumption against awarding child 
custody to a parent responsible for acts of domestic violence may be overcome by means 
other than the completion of the Batterers’ Intervention Program.945 
 
Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V. 
In Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V.,
946
 the supreme court held that in custody proceedings 
where a mother brings allegations of sexual abuse against a father in good faith, the 
mother should not be penalized for an unwillingness to foster a relationship between the 
child and the father.
947
  Stephanie accused Maxwell, the father of her child, of sexually 
abusing the child.
948
 Both parties sought legal and primary physical custody of the 
child.
949
 The trial court found that Stephanie had not proven sexual abuse with 
preponderance of evidence, and that she had shown an unwillingness to foster a 
relationship between Maxwell and the child, which weighed against her receiving 
custody.
950
 On appeal, the supreme court held that Stephanie had alleged sexual abuse in 
good faith, and as such she should not be penalized for an unwillingness to foster a 
relationship between father and child prior to the superior court’s ruling on whether abuse 
occurred.
951
 Remanding in part, the supreme court held that in custody proceedings where 
a mother brings allegations of sexual abuse against a father in good faith, the mother 
should not be penalized for an unwillingness to foster a relationship between the child 
and the father.
952
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Tea ex rel. A.T. 
In Tea ex rel. A.T.,
953
 the supreme court held that a child’s Permanent Fund Dividends 
(“dividends”) may be claimed by redirecting a previously filed application even if the 
claiming party did not have custody of the child on December 31.
954
 The Office of 
Children’s Services (OCS) was granted custody of twins in early 2010.955 After OCS 
notified the Department of Revenue of their custody, OCS was sent the children’s’ 
dividends.
956
 Nevertheless, the mother of the twins, who relinquished parental rights 
voluntarily, filed suit claiming the dividends should be released to her because OCS did 
not have custody of the children on December 31.
957
 On appeal, the twins’ guardian ad 
litem argued that 15 AAC 23.223(i), the regulation at issue, provided two separate ways 
to obtain the children’s dividends, including one that did not require custody on 
December 31 before applying for the dividends.
958
 The supreme court agreed and 
reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the first two sentences of the 
regulation addressed different factual scenarios.
959
 The court further concluded that the 
sentence addressing the redirection of existing applications could not have the same 
December 31 requirement since it would make the second sentence wholly 
superfluous.
960
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a child’s 
dividends may be claimed by redirecting a previously filed application even if the 
claiming party did not have custody of the child on December 31.
961
 
 
Tracy v. State, Department of Health and Human Services  
In Tracy v. State, Department of Health and Human Services,
962
 the supreme court held 
that a court should only award attorney’s fees against a non-prevailing pro se litigant in a 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 case if it can determine that a reasonable layperson would have known 
that his claims were without merit.
963
 Richard and Durena Tracy were the legal guardians 
of their granddaughter, Annie.
964
 After Annie’s kindergarten teacher reported potential 
sexual abuse against Annie by Richard, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) initiated 
an investigation.
965
 The investigation of the Tracys was drawn-out and inconvenient, and 
ultimately concluded that the charge against Richard was in error.
966
 Acting pro se, the 
Tracys sued OCS in superior court for, among other things, a violation of their 
constitutional rights under § 1983.
967
 The superior court granted summary judgment to 
OCS and awarded a percentage of its attorney’s fees.968 On appeal, the supreme court 
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affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment but vacated its award of attorney’s 
fees as an abuse of discretion.
969
 The court reasoned that courts are required to award 
attorney’s fees against unsuccessful pro se litigants only if their claims were meritless 
and asserted in bad faith.
970
 The supreme court held that a court should only award 
attorney’s fees against a non-prevailing pro se litigant in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case if it can 
determine that a reasonable layperson would have known that his claims were without 
merit.
971
 
 
Villars v. Villars 
In Villars v. Villars,
972
 the supreme court held that in the absence of contrary evidence, 
under an agreement about the distribution of military benefits between two divorcing 
spouses, distribution should begin from the moment of collection, not when the benefit-
receiving spouse turns 60 years old.
973
 Richard and Kathleen Villars filed for dissolution 
of marriage in superior court.
974
 During the dissolution proceeding, they agreed that 
Richard’s military retirement benefits would be divided equally between them.975 When 
Kathleen learned that Richard had retired early and begun receiving retirement benefits at 
age 48, she sought and received an order from the superior court requiring half of 
Richard’s military retirement benefits to be paid to her.976 On appeal, Richard argued that 
the settlement agreement and the testimony in the superior court showed that both parties 
intended for his retirement benefits to be his separate property until he reached the age of 
60.
977
 The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the qualified domestic relations order 
accepted by the court, which both parties signed, clearly demonstrated each party’s intent 
to divide the benefits when Richard began receiving them, and that each party clearly 
demonstrated their intent to do the same during the dissolution proceedings.
978
 Affirming, 
the supreme court held that in the absence of contrary evidence, under an agreement 
about the distribution of military benefits between two divorcing spouses, distribution 
should begin from the moment of collection, not when the benefit-receiving spouse turns 
60 years old.
979
 
 
Weinberger v. Weinmeister 
In Weinberger v. Weinmeister,
980
 the supreme court held that rebutting the presumption 
against awarding custody of a child to a parent with a history of perpetuating domestic 
violence, requires that parent to prove that each of the factors in AS § 25.24.150(h) have 
been satisfied.
981
 Weinberger brought an action for child custody against Weinmeister in 
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superior court after an instance of domestic violence led to the couple’s separation.982 
Based on Weinberger’s testimony that Weinmeister had physically abused him on 
multiple occasions, the superior court found that Weinmeister had a history of 
perpetuating domestic violence.
983
 However, the court held that Weinmeister had rebutted 
the presumption in Alaska Statute § 25.24.150(g) and awarded her custody.
984
 On appeal, 
Weinberger argued that the court improperly applied Alaska Statute § 25.24.150(h) by 
reading the statute to say “or” between each of the requisite factors rather than “and.”985 
Reasoning that the legislature intended to require each of the factors to be satisfied before 
overcoming the presumption against awarding custody, the supreme court agreed with 
Weinmeister and reversed the superior court’s custody determination.986  The court note 
Weinmeister had failed to make the requisite showing because she had not completed an 
intervention program for batterers.
987
 Reversing, the supreme court held that rebutting the 
presumption against awarding custody of a child to a parent with a history of perpetuating 
domestic violence, requires that parent to prove that each of the factors in AS § 
25.24.150(h) have been satisfied.
988
 
 
Wilson v. Wilson  
In Wilson v. Wilson,
989
 the supreme court held that the superior court has the authority to 
dismiss or stay a divorce action if there is a reasonable and adequate alternative forum to 
obtain a divorce decree, and issuing that decree may substantially impact property 
division or child custody proceedings in an alternative forum.
990
 Irene Wilson left her 
husband Dennis in Ohio, where they had resided, moved to Alaska with their son, and 
filed for divorce.
991
 Dennis moved for dismissal, asserting the superior court lacked 
jurisdiction.
992
 The superior court dismissed, finding that it lacked both personal 
jurisdiction over Dennis and subject-matter jurisdiction over the child, and that Ohio 
courts would be the proper forum.
993
 Affirming, the supreme court held that a party 
seeking divorce in Alaska, with simultaneous proceedings in another jurisdiction, must 
show good cause and lack of prejudice to obtain a divorce decree.
994
 While the court 
reasoned that Alaska courts can have jurisdiction over divorce proceedings even when 
lacking personal jurisdiction over one party, Alaska courts would not have jurisdiction 
over other claims in this case, such as child custody and property division issues.
995
 
Affirming the superior court’s decision, the court held that the superior court has the 
authority to dismiss or stay a divorce action if there is a reasonable and adequate 
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alternative forum to obtain a divorce decree, and issuing that decree may substantially 
impact property division or child custody proceedings in an alternative forum.
 996
   
 
INSURANCE LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Ennen v. Integon Indemnity Corp. 
In Ennen v. Integon Indemnity Corp.,
997
 the supreme court held that an additional insured 
under an automobile insurance policy may bring a cause of action for bad faith against 
the insurer.
998
 Ennen was seriously injured while a passenger in a car accident when 
Integon Indemnity Corp. (“Integon”) policyholder Shanigan drove off the highway.999 
Integon paid Ennen under the bodily liability provision of the policy, but did not pay 
underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits to Ennen because of a provision limiting UIM.
1000
 
Learning later that this provision was in violation of two Alaska statutes, Integon paid 
Ennen UIM benefits plus prejudgment interest.
1001
 Ennen brought suit against Integon for 
damages, alleging bad faith.
1002
 The superior court held that Ennen did not have a cause 
of action for bad faith because he was an additional insured, as opposed to a “first-party 
insured,” on Shanigan’s policy.1003 The supreme court, vacating the superior court’s 
ruling, distinguished between intended third-party beneficiaries of a contract, who can 
enforce rights in an insurance contract, and incidental beneficiaries, such as tort victims, 
who cannot.
1004
 The court found that whether an insured is a policy-holder or an 
additional insured is immaterial and that both are entitled to bring causes of action for 
bad faith.
1005
 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed, holding that an additional insured 
is entitled to bring a cause of action against the insurer for bad faith.
1006
 
 
Grace v. Peterson  
In Grace v. Peterson,
1007
 the supreme court held that, to the extent that parties do not 
provide sufficient evidence to make a reasonable allocation of a lawsuit settlement 
payment to a separate estate, the award should be classified as marital property.
1008
 After 
Grace suffered brain injuries in a motorcycle crash, he and his wife sued the helmet 
retailer and manufacturer and brought a bad faith action against their insurance 
company.
1009
 The couple separated after the accident, divorced for one month, but then 
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remarried.
 1010 
An interpleader action was brought to the superior court to allocate the 
recovery proceeds.
 1011
 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the superior court's equal 
allocation of an insurance bad faith claim, holding that the classification of tort recoveries 
for purposes of marital property division depends on the loss the recovery was intended 
to replace, not the nature of the cause of action giving rise to recovery.
1012
 The court 
reasoned that proceeds of the settlement were subject to classification as marital and 
separate property rather than divisible equally between husband and wife.
1013
 The 
supreme court held that, to the extent that parties do not provide sufficient evidence to 
make a reasonable allocation of a lawsuit settlement payment to a separate estate, the 
award should be classified as marital property.
1014
 
 
NATIVE LAW 
top  
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
Native Village of Eyak v. Blank 
In Native Village of Eyak v. Blank,
1015
 the Ninth Circuit held that Alaskan Native villages 
do not have exclusive use of claimed portions of outer continental shelf (“OCS”) of the 
Gulf of Alaska where other tribes have fished and hunted on the periphery of the claimed 
territory.
1016
  The Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations limiting access to 
certain fisheries, and the several Alaskan Native villages (“Villages”) claimed the 
regulations failed to account for their non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing 
rights.
1017
  The lower court found the Villages did not have exclusive control, and the 
Villages appealed.
1018
  Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence that other groups 
used land at periphery of OCS defeated the claim that the Villages exclusively used the 
land.
1019
 The court further held that the OCS was such a vast area that the Villages’ low 
population was incapable of controlling any part of the OCS.
1020
 Affirming, the Ninth 
Circuit held that certain Villages do not have exclusive use of claimed portions of outer 
continental shelf of the Gulf of Alaska where other tribes have fished and hunted on the 
periphery of the claimed territory.
1021
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PROPERTY LAW 
top  
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
U.S. v. 300 Units of Rentable Housing 
In U.S. v. 300 Units of Rentable Housing,
1022
 the Ninth Circuit held that a renewal notice 
may be effective even when the amount of rent is undecided, so long as a method for 
determining the rent is disclosed.
1023
  In a first-of-its-kind project, the United States Air 
Force retained ownership of certain real property on which houses were built, but the 
developer owned the houses and would lease them to the Air Force for a term of 20 
years.
1024
 After the initial lease ran, the Government had the option to purchase the 
houses, renew the lease, or have the houses removed.
1025
 The question before the court 
was whether the amount of rent for a renewal term must be specified in the option to 
renew a government lease to make that renewal valid.
1026
  The Ninth Circuit held that, 
because the lease included a method the court could apply to determine the rent, the 
option was enforceable.
1027
  The court noted that the fact that the parties did not come to 
an agreement on rent prior to the renewal date did not render the option invalid since the 
option clause did not expressly require such agreement prior to renewal.
1028
 The Ninth 
Circuit held that a renewal notice may be effective even when the amount of rent is 
undecided, so long as a method for determining the rent is disclosed.
1029
   
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC  
In Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC,
1030
 the supreme court held that including foreclosure 
costs in homeowner reinstatement quotes does not violate Alaska’s non-judicial 
foreclosure statute.
1031
 Albrecht faced foreclosure on her home after defaulting on her 
promissory note, and requested a reinstatement quote.
 1032
 Alaska Trustee provided the 
reinstatement quote and included in it various foreclosure costs including late charges, 
inspection charges, and other fees and costs.
1033
 Albrecht brought a class action lawsuit 
on behalf of similarly-situated homeowners, alleging that the inclusion of such fees 
violated their right to cure under Alaska’s non-judicial foreclosure statute.1034 The 
superior court concluded that Albrecht lacked standing to sue and that the inclusion of 
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such costs in the reinstatement quote was permitted under the statute.
1035
 The supreme 
court affirmed the superior court, holding that the inclusion of foreclosure costs in 
homeowner reinstatement quotes does not violate Alaska’s non-judicial foreclosure 
statute.
1036
 
 
Gold Country Estates Preservation Group, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough 
In Gold Country Estates Preservation Group, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough,
1037
 
the supreme court held that a site visit is a meeting for the purposes of the Open Meeting 
Act when (1) information-gathering and discussion during the visit constitutes 
consideration of a matter on which a governmental body is empowered to act, and (2) the 
visit is a key step in the body’s decision-making process.1038 Gold Country Estates 
Preservation Group (“GCE”) brought an action against Fairbanks North Star Borough 
(“Borough”) after the Borough’s platting board decided to allow a lot owner to build a 
road through GCE’s subdivision.1039 The superior court found that GCE’s covenants 
prohibited the road, but that the Borough had not violated the Open Meeting Act during 
its decision-making process.
1040
 On appeal, GCE argued that the site visit relied upon by 
the Borough’s platting board was a meeting under the Act and that adequate notice of the 
visit had not been given because individual “Dear Property Owner” letters had not been 
sent to homeowners in the subdivision.
1041
 The supreme court agreed with GCE that the 
site visit constituted a meeting under the Act, reasoning that the platting board members 
received evidence at the visit which would help in the decision-making process.
1042
 
However, the supreme court disagreed that “Dear Property Owner” letters were required 
because the site visit was not a meeting in which final resolution of the replatting issue 
would be made.
1043
 The Borough was only required to provide reasonable public notice, 
which was accomplished through newspaper and online announcements.
1044
 Affirming, 
the supreme court held that a site visit is a meeting for the purposes of the Open Meeting 
Act when (1) information-gathering and discussion during the visit constitutes 
consideration of a matter on which a governmental body is empowered to act, and (2) the 
visit is a key step in the body’s decision-making process.1045  
 
Gottstein v. Kraft 
In Gottstein v. Kraft,
1046
 the supreme court held that a home used during marriage but no 
longer occupied is not considered a “family home or homestead,” thus both spouses do 
not need to sign off on its transfer.
1047
 Jim and Terrie Gottstein lived in a home purchased 
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by Jim and deeded to Terrie during their marriage.
1048
 After they moved out and later 
separated, Terrie sold the property for under its appraised value.
1049
 Jim sought to assert 
an interest in the property, citing AS 34.15.010, which requires husband and wife join the 
deed together when conveying a family home.
1050
  The lower court granted summary 
judgment against Jim.
1051
 On appeal, the supreme court held that AS 34.15.010 does not 
apply to a vacant former marital home.
1052
 The supreme court reasoned that since the 
home was not the family’s residence when it was sold, the statute did not require Terrie 
to include Jim in the conveyance.
1053
 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme 
court held that a home used during marriage but no longer occupied is not considered a 
“family home or homestead,” thus both spouses do not need to sign off on its transfer.1054  
 
HP Ltd. Partnership v. Kenai River Airpark 
In HP Ltd. Partnership v. Kenai River Airpark,
1055
 the supreme court held that a covenant 
that only permits single-family dwellings or recreational use of land does not regulate 
ownership of the property.
1056
 After a homeowners association for a multi-family 
subdivision (“Airpark”) assumed possession of a lot to be used for recreational purposes 
in a neighboring single-family subdivision, a developer for the property sued to prevent 
Airpark from using it, claiming Airpark’s ownership violated covenants attached to the 
lot including a single-family restriction.
1057
 On appeal, the supreme court held that while 
the single-family restriction was ambiguous in that it could either be a land use or a 
building use restriction, it placed no limitation on ownership of the lot.
1058
 The supreme 
court reasoned that Airpark was permitted to own the land, so long as it did not violate 
other features of the covenant.
1059
 Affirming the superior court’s ruling on this particular 
issue, the supreme court held that a covenant that only permits single-family dwellings or 
recreational use of land does not regulate ownership of the property.
1060
 
 
Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC 
In Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC,
1061
 the supreme court held that foreclosure fees may 
be included in a sum in default, and therefore a lender could add foreclosure fees to a 
reinstatement amount.
1062
 Kuretich purchased a home in 2001, and when he fell behind 
on his mortgage payments in 2008, his mortgage company authorized Alaska Trustee, 
LLC to begin foreclosure proceedings.
1063
 Kuretich paid a reinstatement fee that included 
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foreclosure costs, but again fell behind on payments in 2009.
1064
 This time, he refused to 
pay the foreclosure costs included in the reinstatement fee, arguing that they did not 
consist of “sums in default” under the Alaska statute detailing foreclosure 
proceedings.
1065
 The court reasoned that including foreclosure fees and costs in a 
reinstatement fee was consistent with the statute, especially when the homeowner’s deed 
of trust with the mortgage company specifically indicates that reinstatement fees include 
the costs incident to foreclosure.
1066
 Affirming the superior court and adopting its 
decision, the supreme court held that foreclosure fees may be included in a sum in 
default, and therefore a lender could add foreclosure fees to a reinstatement amount.
1067
 
 
Oakes v. Holly 
In Oakes v. Holly,
1068
 the supreme court held that the doctrine of mutual mistake does not 
apply to drafting errors in proposals for judicial partition of property.
1069
  Oakes and 
Holly both owned interest in a twenty-acre parcel of land.
1070
 Oakes filed a complaint for 
judicial partition and both parties agreed to partition the property with both parties 
submitting three proposals.
1071
 The superior court selected one of Oakes’ partition 
proposals; however upon completion of a survey, an error in the map proposed to the 
superior court was discovered, with more valuable albeit less land going to Holly.
1072
 The 
superior court determined that since the proposal was not an accurate portrayal of the 
property, there was a material mutual mistake of fact related to a basic assumption of the 
contract.
1073
  Oakes, the party requesting a revised partition, bore the risk of mistake and 
the superior court enforced Oakes’ proposal as surveyed despite the error.1074 The 
supreme court reasoned that the parties’ agreement to submit three proposals to the court 
was analogous to a partial settlement contract; however, the drafting error in the 
proposals was not a mistake related to contract formation.
1075
 The court stated that the 
parties agreed to a judicial partition, whereby the parties agreed to adopt procedures to 
resolve the litigation
1076
 and the mistake in the proposals occurred three months after this 
agreement.
1077
 Remanding on other grounds, the court held that the doctrine of mutual 
mistake does not apply to drafting errors in proposals for judicial partition of property.
1078
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Reed v. Parrish 
In Reed v. Parrish,
1079
 the supreme court held that mortgage payments made pursuant to a 
domestic violence protection order are not credited to the paying party during property 
division post-separation of a domestic partnership.
1080
 From 1998 to 2009, Reed and 
Parrish were in a romantic relationship.
1081
 The couple had two children together but 
never married.
1082
 In 2009, Parrish obtained a domestic violence protection order against 
Reed and was awarded possession of the house the two purchased together, while Reed 
was ordered to continue to make mortgage payments.
1083
 On appeal, Reed argued that the 
lower court erred in not crediting him for the mortgage payments he made.
1084
 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision to not credit Reed for the mortgage 
payments made pursuant to the domestic violence protection order.
1085
 Since the domestic 
violence protection order awarded Parrish the house and ordered Reed to continue to 
make mortgage payments, the court reasoned that to credit the mortgage payments would 
disrupt the relief granted to Parrish in the order.
1086
 Furthermore, the court found that the 
mortgage payments provided stability for the couple’s children during the litigation 
because Parrish had always stayed home to care for them.
1087
 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that mortgage payments made pursuant to a domestic 
violence protection order are not credited to the paying party during property division 
post-separation of a domestic partnership.
1088
 
 
Roberson v. Manning 
In Roberson v. Manning,
1089
 the supreme court held that, by itself, failure to transfer title 
does not necessarily mean a person’s ownership in a vehicle has not been transferred to 
another person.
1090
 Roberson and Manning purchased a motor home together.
1091
 Later, at 
a hearing for protective order against Roberson, Manning promised that he was going to 
pay off what he owed and that Roberson could have his ownership share.
1092
 However, 
Manning later titled the mobile home in only his name and sold it.
1093
 Roberson sued for 
declatory and injunctive relief, but the superior court concluded that Manning did not 
give his share of the mobile home to Roberson since there was no title transferred to 
her.
1094
 On appeal, Roberson argued that she owned the mobile home in its entirety 
because Manning gave her his share.
1095
 The supreme court vacated and remanded the 
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lower court’s conclusion that a lack of title transfer was dispositive in proving Manning 
never gave his ownership in the mobile home to Roberson.
1096
 The court reasoned that 
failure to transfer title creates a presumption that ownership had not been delivered, but 
other evidence, such as oral testimony, could outweigh the presumption.
1097
 Vacating and 
remanding the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that failure to transfer title 
does not necessarily mean a person’s ownership in a vehicle has not been transferred to 
another person.
1098
 
 
Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc. 
In Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc.,
1099
 the supreme court held 
that the mootness exception for attorney’s fees allows a plaintiff without ongoing 
standing to pursue an appeal if review of the main issue in the case could potentially 
relieve him of liability for attorney’s fees.1100 Conflict developed between Schweitzer and 
members of the Subdivision Association over a property easement.
1101
 Each party filed 
suit, attempting to quiet title on certain lots and determine the reach of the easement.
1102
 
The superior court ruled against Schweitzer and assessed attorney’s fees against him.1103 
Schweitzer subsequently lost title to his property through foreclosure, thus depriving him 
of standing upon appeal and rendering his appeal of the superior court’s decision 
moot.
1104
 Overruling objections by the Subdivision Association, the supreme court agreed 
to hear Schweitzer’s appeal on the main issue in the case despite its mootness because 
such a review provides the only recourse for plaintiffs with extensive liability for 
attorney’s fees.1105 The supreme court reasoned that the mootness exception for 
attorney’s fees seeks to recognize a party’s continued interest in a claim based on liability 
for attorney’s fees even when he otherwise lacks standing to pursue an appeal.1106 
Affirming, the supreme court held that the mootness exception for attorney’s fees allows 
a plaintiff without ongoing standing to pursue an appeal if review of the main issue in the 
case could potentially relieve him of liability for attorney’s fees.1107 
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TORT LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc. 
In Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc.,
1108
 the supreme court held that manufacturers have a 
post-sale duty to inform consumers of potentially life-threatening dangers in their 
products that become apparent after the sale.
1109
 Jones accidentally amputated his leg 
while working on a hydromulcher manufactured by Bowie Industries (“Bowie”).1110 He 
filed various tort claims against Bowie, and at trial the court instructed the jury that 
Bowie had a duty to warn Jones of life-threatening dangers associated with the 
hydromulcher.
1111
 On appeal, Bowie argued there was no post-sale duty to warn.
1112
 
Affirming, the supreme court held that manufacturers have a post-sale duty to inform 
consumers of potentially life-threatening dangers in their products, even if these dangers 
do not become apparent until after the purchase.
1113
 The court reasoned that where a 
manufacturer has reason to know of a potentially life-threatening risk, and can identify 
recipients of the sale, then the manufacturer should give notice to those consumers.
1114
  
Affirming, the supreme court held that manufacturers have a post-sale duty to inform 
consumers of potentially life-threatening dangers in their products that become apparent 
after the sale.
1115
 
 
TRUSTS & ESTATES LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Dan v. Dan 
In Dan v. Dan,
1116
 the supreme court held that (1) the contents and execution of a will 
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence,
1117
 and (2) the presumption that a lost 
will was destroyed for the purposes of revocation is a rebuttable presumption.
1118
 Rose 
executed a will in 1987.
1119
 Later, she executed a second will that revoked the first; 
however this revised will was lost before probate.
1120
 During probate, one of Rose’s three 
daughters produced an accurate copy of the second will but because the will was not 
signed, the court concluded that it must find that Rose destroyed the original will to 
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revoke it.
1121
 The court then divided the estate according to intestate succession.
1122
 The 
supreme court, relying on other jurisdictions and concerned that a low standard could 
lead to cases of fraud, held that the contents of a lost will must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.
1123
 The supreme court also held that the presumption of revocation 
based upon destruction is rebuttable.
1124
 Since the superior court did not announce 
whether Rose’s proper execution of a second will met the clear and convincing standard 
and did not find whether the evidence presented at trial overcame the presumption that 
Rose revoked the will, the supreme court remanded to the superior court.
1125
 Remanding 
for further inquiry, the supreme court held that (1) the contents and execution of a will 
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence,
1126
 and (2) the presumption that a lost 
will was destroyed for the purposes of revocation is a rebuttable presumption.
1127
   
 
Pestrikoff v. Hoff 
In Pestrikoff v. Hoff,
1128
 the supreme court held that the concept of equitable distribution 
used in divorce proceedings does not apply in probate proceedings.
1129
 After Dorothy 
Morrison died intestate, her children from a previous marriage claimed that her property 
with her husband at death should be evaluated according to the principle of equitable 
distribution of marital property.
1130
 Thus, a boat to which Morrison’s husband had sole 
title, but which was purchased during their marriage, would become an undivided interest 
of the estate and ultimately passed to the children.
1131
 However, there was strong 
evidence that the pair had intended for Hoff to individually preserve title to the boat.
1132
 
Affirming the lower court ruling that title to the boat be preserved, the supreme court held 
that equitable distribution as used in divorce proceedings should not be used in probate 
proceedings.
1133
 The court reasoned that unlike in divorce proceedings, it was clear from 
legislative history and prior case law that Alaska’s probate statute determined ownership 
based on title, and that the legislature did not intend for property to be retitled upon 
spousal death.
1134
 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the concept of 
equitable distribution used in divorce proceedings does not apply in probate 
proceedings.
1135
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